頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | Reputation Assessment and Signaling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information |
---|---|
作 者 | 陳至還; | 書刊名 | 經濟研究. 臺北大學經濟學系 |
卷 期 | 37:1 2001.01[民90.01] |
頁 次 | 頁1-30 |
分類號 | 561.14 |
關鍵詞 | 通貨膨脹賽局; 同策略均衡; 異策略均衡; Inflation game; Pooling equilibrium; Separating equilibrium; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 在通貨膨脹賽局的相關文獻中,經常呈現兩種迥然不同的結果,常令學者感到困惑不解,其中一種結果可以Backus & Driffill(1985a, b)Barro(1986)的文章為代表,係指軟弱型(傾向擴張貨幣供給以刺激經濟)的政策決策者將會其上任之初模仿強硬型(傾向反通貨膨脹)決策者的政策作風以建立威信(reputation),留待日後伺機利用公眾的信任套取政策上的利益;另一種結果則以Vickers(1986)的文章為代表,他認為強硬型決策者經常會採取超乎常態最適化的反通貨膨脹政策,以擺脫被懷疑可能是軟弱型的疑竇,並確立其威信。本文目的在於探究造成前述兩種分歧結果的根源。 |
英文摘要 | There is an unresolved issue in the literature of inflation games, arising from two strikingly different scenarios. One, as in Backus and Driffill (1985a, b) and Barro (1986), indicates that an inflation-prone policymaker may find it optimal to mimic the action of a more inflation-averse policymaker to build up his reputation and reap a benefit at later time. The other, as in Vickers (1986), claims that an inflation-averse policymaker will undershoot his perfect-information optimum to separate itself form a more inflation-prone counterparts. This paper attempts to uncover and analyze the reason why authors have reached such contrasting conclusions. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。