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| 題 名 | 澳洲的東亞安全政策--以澳臺關係為主=Australian Security Policy in East Asia: With Particular Reference to Australia-Taiwan Relations |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | Trood,Russell; | 書刊名 | 澳洲研究 |
| 卷 期 | 1 2000[民89.] |
| 頁 次 | 頁1-19 |
| 分類號 | 578.712 |
| 關鍵詞 | 外交; 澳洲; 東亞安全政策; 臺灣; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 近年來澳洲越來越強調擴大與東亞國家的安全合作。目前安全合作關係在東北亞進展的不如東南亞，但是從澳洲政策決策者的觀點看來這類安全合作關係的價值與重要性正與日俱增。雖然在地理上東北亞離澳洲的立即戰略利益地區有相當的距離，然而對坎培拉而言東北亞仍然很重要因為該地區是強權利益交錯的樞紐，對整個東亞地區安全環境的形成有直接的關聯，而且是許多澳洲最重要的區域雙邊關係所在的地區。 與中共、日本、南韓相較，澳洲與中華民國的雙邊關係尚屬低度開發且大抵上是以經濟關係為主。澳洲與東北亞地區其他國家所正在日益增加的安全接觸之態勢並未擴及臺灣，而在短期內也不太可能有任何變化。儘管如此，從一九九六年三月臺海危機澳洲支持美國的政策顯示，坎培拉對臺灣未來的興趣應該不會只是暫時性的。澳洲最關切的是希望見到臺海兩岸和平演進，並在兩岸政府利益獲致妥協方式下解決北京與臺北間的歧見。雖然這些將澳洲利益與臺灣未來連接起來，但是坎培拉對臺北政策的導向仍將持續受到一連串具有抵制作用的考量所影響，而且並不侷限於澳洲意圖其與中共關係維持不變。 |
| 英文摘要 | In recent years Australia has placed increasing emphasis on the expansion of security cooperation with the states of East Asia. In Northeast Asia these cooperative relationships are less developed than in Southeast Asia, but from the perspective of Australian policy makers they are of growing value and importance. Although geographically distant from Australia’s area of immediate strategic interests serve to shape the security environment of whole East Asia region and as the location of many of Australia’s most important regional bilateral relationships. Compared to China, Japan and South Korea, Australia’s bilateral relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) are underdeveloped, consisting largely of a significant economic relationship. The growing array of security contacts between Australia and each of the other countries of Northeast Asia has not been extended to Taiwan and in the short term this will not change. Nevertheless, as Canberra’s support for United States policy at the time of the March 1966 straits crisis demonstrated, Canberra has more than a passing interest in the Taiwan’s future. Australia’s overriding concern is to see the peaceful evolution of relations between Taiwan and China and the resolution of differences between Beijing and Taipei in a way that accommodates the interests of governments on both sides of the straits. While this links Australia’s interests to Taiwan’s future, the direction of Canberra’s policy towards Taipei continues to be shaped by a series of countervailing considerations, not least Australia’s desire to preserve the integrity of its relations with China. For all this however, it seems certain that for the foreseeable future Australia’s formal security relations with Taiwan will remain constrained by the reality of Australia’s one China policy. This will limit the prospects for official bilateral dialogue on regional security issues. Nevertheless, several avenues to expanded consultation remain open. First, the two governments should take opportunities for official discussions (including at ministerial level) during regional multilateral meetings and forums. Taiwan’s limited membership of these forums places restrictions on this opportunities, but within APEC (of which Taiwan is a member and where bilateral discussions are an established part of the annual summit process) a regular process of dialogue is well within reach. Second, it would be useful to regularise meetings along the lines of the first Taiwanese-Australian regional security dialogue held in Canberra in 1992. Although this meeting was convened by academics from the Australian National University officials from several Australian government agencies sat in on the talks which also included participation from sections of the Taiwan military. Third, Australian members of the Conference on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) should continue to ensure that Taiwan remains part of the CSCAP process and that its academics participate as fully as possible in its councils and working groups. Fourth, academic and research institutions in both Australia and Taiwan should be encouraged to develop closer research contacts with regard to security issues. Particular effort might be directed to establishing joint research projects which will draw faculty members into regular contact through workshops and conferences. Fifth, and finally, both sides might seek to expand parliamentary contacts. The ‘unofficial’ visit to Taiwan in May 1994 by an Australian parliamentary delegation comprising members of the Joint Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade offers a model for this initiative. These are modest initiatives, but it is unrealistic to expect the Australian government to move either strongly or directly towards a more comprehensive security relationship with Taiwan. Given its strategic position, its military capability, the importance of the bilateral economic relationship with Australia and the generally favourable position Taiwan occupies in the Australian consciousness, there is much to be said in favour of establishing close security relations. At the very least, the kind of regular security dialogue that Australia enjoys with many other states of the region would seem likely to prove of value to both sides. In the short term however, Australia’s one China policy makes even this an unrealistic goal. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。