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題 名 | 隨機年金費率與怠惰行為=Random Contribution Rate and Shirk |
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作 者 | 吳博欽; | 書刊名 | 臺灣社會福利學刊 |
卷 期 | 1 2000.09[民89.09] |
頁 次 | 頁71-92 |
分類號 | 548.9 |
關鍵詞 | 事後隨機性; 道德危害; 柏瑞圖改善; 隨機性提撥制; Post randomization; Moral hazard; Pareto-improving; Random; Contribution plan; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文建立「隨機年金費率模型」以解決勞動市場所衍生的「道德危害」問題。文中證明雇主只需採行三種年金費率政策,即可發揮柏瑞圖改善效果(提升工作努力程度與預期利潤)。隨機年金年率政策的有效性決定於受雇勞工對風險的態度。趨避風險的受雇者較偏好風險的受雇者更有利於採行隨機年金費率政策。公司規模愈小或趨避風險受雇者分擔年金費用比率愈高,隨機政策愈容易解決受雇勞工怠惰行為。以管理規模觀之,隨機政策應用在勞動市場中,其效果優於在保險市場與租稅問題上。為期達到柏瑞圖效率,雇主應提高受雇勞工風險趨避關於工作努力程度的彈性,或者降低受雇勞工獲取契約所得機率關於工作努力程度的彈性。 |
英文摘要 | This paper sets up “random contribution rate model” to resolve the “moral hazard” problem, derived from labor market. There are at most three contribution rate policies for the employer to have Pareto-improving effect. The effectiveness of random contribution rate policy depends on the risk attitude of employee. For the risk averter, it is more easier for the random policy to produce expected effect. The less scale the firm is or the more contribution rate the risk averter shares, the more easy for the random policy to resolve employee’s shirk problem. In view of management scale, the effect is better for random policy to apply in labor market than in insurance market or taxation problem. To reach Pareto efficient, employer must increase the elasticity of absolute risk aversion with respect to work effort, or to reduce that of the probability to obtain the contracted-income with respect to work effort. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。