查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 歐盟競爭法程序規範之研究=Studying the Procedural Rules of the European Union's Competition Law |
---|---|
作者姓名(中文) | 王耀慶; | 書刊名 | 公平交易季刊 |
卷期 | 8:4 2000.10[民89.10] |
頁次 | 頁31-92 |
分類號 | 585.8 |
關鍵詞 | 歐盟競爭法; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 整個歐盟競爭法之規範體系架構,主要你由羅馬條約第八十五條至第九十四條之規定,以及第4064/89號結合管制規則所構成,而一般法律原則亦係歐盟競爭法體系之一環。與歐盟競爭法有關的機關,計有執委會、理事會、歐洲議會及歐洲法院,執委會第四總署則負責競爭政策之執行。歐盟第17/62號理事會規則係聯合行為之個別除外規範程序之基礎,而以第3385/94號規則、第2842/98號規則以及其他閱卷規則、罰鍰標準、罰鍰減免以及聽證官權限等規定為輔。 違反羅馬條約第八十五條之協議,執委會得單純作成宣告違反之決定、命消極行為或積極行為措施、科以罰鍰決定,以及命暫時措施之決定。至於合法決定,則有個別除外與否定證明二類。執委會合法決定之效力,通說認為優先於內國法院之判斷。其次,非正式接觸、非正式調查乃至於非正式決定之作成,均是執委會實務上常使用之方式。然非正式決定之作成,並無法律拘束力,亦不得向歐洲法院起訴。司法救濟分成二級二審,由第一審法院負責審理罰鍰訴訟、決定之撤銷訴訟、不作為訴訟以及損害賠償訴訟,事業並得要求暫時措施之保護。為減輕行政負荷,歐盟競爭法發展出多種聯合行為之集體除外規則,符合規定者即生自動除外之效力,給予事業明確之遵循標準。其不僅可促進行政效率,更提供事業一個快速方便之程序,對我國之法制亦有所店主示與參考。 歐盟對於市場控制地位濫用之規範程序,原則上與聯合程序相同,不同之處在於市場控制地位濫用之規範係採事後管制,且1997年罰鍰減免規則亦無法適用,此條因其僅通用於祕密協議之故。其次,歐盟對於事業結合管制之程序,主要以第4064/89號規則與第447/98號規則為規範依據,採事前許可制度,審查程序則分成初步階段及詳細審查階段。調查程序、閱卷以及聽證程序雖與聯合行為規範之依據不同,然內涵則大同小異,而其司法救濟程序亦同。針對聯合行為之程序制度設計而言,歐盟之集體除外程序實頗值我國參考。就基本人權之充分保障而言,歐盟法制更是走在我國之前端,我國實有迎頭趕上之必要。 |
英文摘要 | The first chapter introduces the research motive and the goals of the essay. The second chapter is to overview the concept of the European Union's Competition Law. First, I introduce the development of the European Union's Competition Law. The entire system is made up from Article 85 to Article 94 of the EC Treaty and the Council Regulation 4064/89. In addition, the general principles, including the protection of foundation rights, the requirement of legal certainty, the principle of proportionality and the principle of fairness re one part of the framework. Finally, I introduce those organizations and the powers of those organs, especially the DGIV. The third chapter begins with individual exemption rules of cartels by Regulation 17/62. Regulation 3385/94, Regulation 2842/98 and other rules, such as rules for access to the file guidelines of fines. Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines and rules of hearing officer. The commission can make declaratory decision or enforcement decision to the cartel that measure decision and fines decision. On the contrary, the commission can make individual exemption decision and negative clearance. Foundationally, the legal effect of the commission's decision is superior than the national court's judgments. In practice, the commission frequently takes measures by informal procedures, but there is no legal effect on these procedures. The last part is the proceedings of the court concerning the European Union's Competition Law. The fourth chapter is the block exemption rule for cartels, for EC's Competition Law has developed many block exemption regulations in order to release the commission's burden. Only when complying with the block regulation, could cartels automatically exempt itself. The effective and convenient procedure may offer some hints and references to our regime. Chapter Five introduces the procedural rules of abusing the dominating-position. The procedure is different from the former procedure. It can't apply to the notice on non-imposition or reduction. Secondly, I introduce the procedural rules of merger by Council Regulation 4064/89 and Commission Regulation 447/98. In principle, the commission's inspection-procedures, access to the files, hearing-procedures and plea-procedures are the same with the procedures for cartels. The undertakings must notify to the commission within one week after merging. Only when the merger of serous take action into the second step. The last chapter is to make the long story short for the essay. It is necessary and proper for us to adopt the advantage of the block exemption procedure and make it urgent to match the foundation-protection of human rights. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。