頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 如何馴服憲政怪獸?--大法官會議違憲審查個案研究=Taming a Constitutional Monster?--A Case Study of the Supreme Constitutional Review in an Emerging Democracy |
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作者 | 熊秉元; Hsiung, Bingyuang; |
期刊 | 經社法制論叢 |
出版日期 | 20000700 |
卷期 | 26 2000.07[民89.07] |
頁次 | 頁235-262 |
分類號 | 581.24 |
語文 | chi |
關鍵詞 | 制衡; 競爭; 制憲; 釋憲; Checks and balances; Competition; Framers; Constitutional interpretation; |
中文摘要 | 當國民大會通過「自我延任」的修憲條文時,大法官會議是否可以站在釋憲者的立場,經由司法審查而宣佈修憲條文違憲?釋憲者能否凌駕制(修)憲者的決定?本文由理論和實証兩方面,處理這些問題。在理論上,主要的結論有兩點:第一,民主政治的「制衡」和經濟動動裡的「競爭」的共同精神為「其他的可能性」;第二,大法官會議釋憲的權威,在於「不受挑戰」。此外,本文也描述和分析聲請釋憲的過程和結果。 |
英文摘要 | When the National Assembly passed the Constitutional amendment to extend the term of its members, can the Grand Justices declare the Amendment unconstitutional through the constitutional review? That is, can the interpreters of the Constitution surpass the will of the framers of the Constitution surpass the will of the framers of the Constitution? These and related issues are examined in this paper. There are two theoretical findings: First, the common factor between the political concept of checks and balances and the economic concept of competition is the idea of potential alternatives. Secondly, the ultimate authority of the Grand Justices comes from the principle of being uncontested. In addition, the paper describes as well as analyses the process of seeking the constitutional review concerning the amendment and the Grand Justices' rulings. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。