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題 名 | 有線電視產業系統業者頻道組合與訂價策略之研究=The Study of Channel Assortment and Pricing Strategies of Cable Systems |
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作 者 | 周善瑜; 吳基逞; | 書刊名 | 管理學報 |
卷 期 | 17:1 2000.03[民89.03] |
頁 次 | 頁71-100 |
分類號 | 557.77 |
關鍵詞 | 有線電視; 訂價策略; 頻道組合策略; Cable; Pricing strategy; Channel assortment strategy; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本論文嘗試以賽局分析的方式,探討有線電視產業系統業者間的競爭問題。主要 目標有二,第一為探討雙佔結構下的系統業者如何選擇其頻道組合與訂價策略;第二為分析 系統業者競爭結構的決定因素。本論文假設收視戶有兩種型態,一種為只對某些頻道感興趣 ,我們稱之為單頻道喜愛者,另一種人對所有頻道均感興趣,我們稱之為多頻道喜愛者,此 種收視戶並會因頻道選擇增加而產生額外的效用 (我們稱之為互補效用 )。在以上的假設下 ,我們得到:(1) 喜歡看多頻道的收視戶愈多,系統業者的競爭將更為激烈,使得收視月費 會較低。(2) 收視戶對系統業者所共有的顏道偏好大小並不會影響收視月費。(3) 在其他情 形不變下,當數視戶對某頻道偏好上升時,有可能使得原本擁有此一頻道的系統業者停播此 一頻道或者以其他頻道代替此一頻道。(4) 當互補效用夠大時,系統業者的均衡頻道組合既 不會是尋求最大差異化,也不會是尋求最小差異化。最後,在水平競爭結構方面,我們發現 當愛好多頻道的收視戶佔總收視戶的比例增加時,系統業者的水平競爭結構將較集中。 |
英文摘要 | We analyze two inperfectly competitive firms' equilibrium pricing and channel-selecting behavior in a cable TV industry. Two segments of consumers are assumed. The loyal consumers are interested in one particular channel and attach zero value to other channels. The variety-seekers attach a positive value for each and every channel, and the value they attach to a bundle of channels is strictly higher than the sum of values they attach to individual channels; i.e. their preferences exhibit" variety benefits." The following results are obtained. First, firms compete more aggressively in equilibrium when there are more variety-seekers or when the variety benefits are higher. Second, the equilibrium prices are independent of consumers' valuations for commonly offered channels. Third, surprisingly, an increase in consumers' valuation for a particular channel may prompt the firms to drop the channel from their equilibrium bundles. Fourth, when the variety benefits are high enough, neither maximum nor minimum differentiation in the firms' channel bundles is possible. Finally, the competitive structure of the cable industry tends ot be more concentrated when there are more variety-seekers. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。