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題名 | 論關係企業法=A Commentary on Affiliated Companies Law |
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作者 | 劉紹樑; | 書刊名 | 經社法制論叢 |
卷期 | 21 1998.01[民87.01] |
頁次 | 頁1-39 |
分類號 | 587.2 |
關鍵詞 | 關係企業法; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文對公司法增修之關係企業專章予以引介及評述,並於第一章敘述本專章 之有關規定,以及作者之評論,本文第二章則分析現有之法令規與會計準則之 中,與關係企業有關之規定。第二章並就有關關係人交易及關係企業之現有規定 與公司關係企業專章之規定予以比較,以作為未來適用、解釋該專章之參考。 本文第一章追溯民國六十年代迄今有關本專章之草擬背景,以及為加入世界 貿易組織推動有關立法,以致本專章之草案得以一併立法之政治背景,並認為本 專章之缺陷在於對關係企業之定義過於偏狹,以致無法包括實際控制之關係人。 作者並認為此一問題之核心應在於強調對實質控制人及負責人加強「誠信義務」 之執行。 本文繼而討論本專章之責任規範,以及美國公司法學上「揭開公司面紗」及 「次順位受償之衡平原則」等理論移植入本專章之情形,但認為此一移植囿於我 國大陸法系之特性,以及所移植之原則未及於其前要件,其未來作效或將有 限。 本專章尚有其他缺失之處,如對「不利益之經營」被列為責任規範之依據, 似有將誠信義務與善良管理人之注意義務予以混淆之嫌,甚至與美國法上「商業 半斷原則」不盡相符。且本專章似未認容以無利害關係人表決之方式解決關係人 交易弊害之方案,與公司現行規定不符。 本專章之規定亦予從屬公司之債權人與少數股東提起代位訴訟之權利,惟此 一機制可能造成「搭便車」之執法反誘因,以及「來者不善」並利用此規定詐為 起訴之道德風險。此外,本文一併分析法院評斷此等問題之能力,並認為我國法 院對此等商業行為之對價是否相當之認定,尚有加強之餘地。 本文第二章繼而整理現行民、刑、訴訟、公司、銀行、證券等法令與關係人 交易及關係企業有關之規定,並彙整為若干通則如禁止、阻絕、無效、揭露、對 價、評鑑、提呈等原則,以作為未來適用、解釋本專章條文之參考。此外、本文 並就證期會、交易所有關函令及會計公報第六號有閞規定與本專章之規定予以比 較。 本文之結論認為關係人交易及關係企業於華人及亞洲社會盛行其來有自,現 行法規原已有所規範,關係企業專章仍應貴在執行,否則法令疊床架屋,無法完 全解決此一問題。 |
英文摘要 | Partner, Lee and Li and Associate Professor, Graduate School of Law, Soochow University. This paper offers a commentary on the law and policy of the recent amendment to Taiwan's Company Law adding a chapter governing affiliated companies. It first describes the provisions of this new chapter and offers a critique. This is followed by an analysis of various preecisting laws, regulations and accounting conventions governing affiliated companies and related party transactions. Comparison with the new amendment yields insights for guiding the future interpretation and enforcement of this new amendment. This paper first recounts, in part I, the long history of the draft Affiliated Companies Law since the late 1970s and explains how the politics of enacting legislation, including the Company Law amendment, in connection with Taiwan's accession to the World Trade Organization led to this new legislation governing affiliated companies. It also criticizes the narrow definition of affiliated companies, which fails to follow the "actual control" test to capture all those who are in a controlling position. A better approach, argues the author, would be to focus on the fiduciary duty of controlling persons and executive officers The paper goes on to review the liability regime, which attempts to transplant both "Piercing the corportate veil" and "equitable subordination" doctrines from American corporate law. Such a transplant, argues this paper, is crude as Taiwan's corporate law reflects strong Civil Law influence and the preconditions for piercing the corporate veil under American law are not required under the new Affiliated Companies Law. The author also points out other deficiencies in this regime. For example, the wrongful conduct giving rise to liability includes a management act by the controlling company causing adverse impact on the controlled companies. Therefore, the new amendment may have confused the duty of due care with the duty of loyalty. This confusion is a departure from the American corporate law doctrine known as the "busimess judgment rule". In addition, this new regime does not take into consideration the mechanism for disinterested voting which would legitimize otherwise dubious related party transactions. Such deficiencies could create difficulties in linking the new rules with preexisting provisions of the Company Law that allow such disinterested voting. The new law also provides for actions by creditors and minority shareholders in their own name and for the benefit of the controlled companies to seek compensation. A "free rider" problem is created by this enforcement mechanism, andd there could be a moral hazard of controlling companies asking willing minority shareholders to bring sham litigation so as to preempt genuine private enforcement actions. In this regards, the paper also assessed the comparative advantages of courts in Taiwan to review the legality of such related party transactions, and concluded that the courts need to be educated on business practice in order to make informed decisions. In partII this paper examines a wide variety of existing economic and commercial legislation, including the Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, Criminal Code, other provisions of the Company Law, Banking Law, Securities and Exchange Law, and related regulations and rules under such laws, governign related party transactions. The author distills several principles from these preexisting laws such as prohibition, nullification, disgorgement of illegal profit, disclosure of related party transactions, approval by high-level and disinterested decision makers, arms length bargaining and third-party valuation. These principles, argues the author, would be instrumental in guiding the future interpretations of the Affiliated Conpanies Law. Also in partII the author reviews the relevant convention under Taiwan's generally acceptyed accounting principles and interpretative rulings of the Securities and Futures Commission and Taiwan Stock Exchange governing related party transactions. They contain rules and concepts more concrete and definitive than those found in the new amendment. The author concludes with the ovservations that related party transactions are common in the Asian-Chinese culture, and that the legal treatment of related party transactions would be better resolved by focusing on faithfully enforcing existing rules than legislating additional rules |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。