頁籤選單縮合
題名 | Sticky Prices, Adjustment Costs, and Cost-reducing Uncertainty in the Presence of R&D Joint Ventures= |
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作者 | Lee, Yao-hsien; Chen, Hui-chun; Kung, Sheu-chin; |
期刊 | International Journal of Information and Management Sciences |
出版日期 | 20081200 |
卷期 | 19:4 2008.12[民97.12] |
頁次 | 頁691-716 |
分類號 | 494.7 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | Research joint ventures; RJVs; Sticky prices; Adjustment costs; Cost-reducing uncertainty; |
英文摘要 | We attempt to fill the gap left by the earlier models by considering sticky prices and adjustment costs in a dynamic duopolistic competition model with cost reducion uncertainty. To be specific, an infinite horizon, two-player, linear-quadratic differential game model is formulated and analyzed. The players are firms that sell a homogeneous product in the same market. The players also conduct cooperative R&D project and share the results of their R&D efforts, so each can benefit from its research joint ventures (RJVs) in terms of cost reduction. Our results show that regardless of cost-reducing uncertainty, the firm's R&D effort, R&D knowledge accumulation, and output in the feedback Nash equilibrium are greater than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The more the sticky prices are, the lower the firm's R&D effort level and R&D knowledge accumulation will be. If cost-reducing uncertainty is not too large and the firm's risk aversion is not too strong, then RJVs in the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the feedback Nash equilibrium have anticompetitive effects. |
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