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來源資料
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題 名 | 盈餘與股價對管理者交易行為之影響=The Effect of Accounting Earnings and Stock Price on Managerial Trading Behavior |
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作 者 | 林宜勉; | 書刊名 | 管理會計 |
卷 期 | 50 1999.10[民88.10] |
頁 次 | 頁38-60 |
分類號 | 495.77 |
關鍵詞 | 會計盈餘; 資訊不對稱; 股權結構; 薪資契約; 會計選擇; Reported earnings announcements; Information asymmetry; Ownership structure; Compensation contract; Accounting choice; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 理論上,當管理者持有公司部份股權時,易於產生道德危機。若管理者持股比率愈少,其從事非極大化公司價值的行為之動機愈強。譬如,管理者愈有可能加速收益與遞延費用之認列,亦即選擇使公司盈餘較高的會計方法,藉以使自己獲取較高獎酬;唯這項行動卻造成公司必須支付較多稅捐,致使公司現金流量減少。相反地,當管理者欲從事接收行為時,則會選擇使股價降低的會計方法,並且損害股東利益。因而當公司所有權與控制權分離時,通常契約上也會包垥以會計為基礎的限制,來防止管理者進行減損公司價值的活動。本研究擬在主理人提供給管理者的契約中,考慮會計盈餘、股票價格、會計方法的選擇以及管理者持股比率時,推導出均衡證券價格模式與管理者的最適需求訂單。 由模式推導結果可歸納出下列幾項結論:(1)價格為其與盈餘報告對現金流量的充分統計量,故在設計管理者薪資契約時,主理人不須將權數放在盈餘報告上,只須從價格中汲取現金流量的資訊。(2)已實現的現金流量總額愈高,管理者對公司股票的需求股份愈大。(3)當盈餘愈高估已實現的現金流量時,管理者的需求股份愈少。(4)管理者的需求規則視其所選擇的努力而定,又努力受其持有股數多寡之影響。(5)管理者對公司股票的需求亦視管理者與流動性交易者的總需求,對價格之影響而定。(6)當市場流動性愈大,管理者愈不會經由交易來影響股價,故其投機性交易之絕對值愈大。(7)當公司真實現金流量愈接近管理者的努力時,表示管理者忠誠度愈高,故交易需求愈小。(8)當會計報告的精確度愈高時,表示管理者向心力愈強,故其交易需求愈少。 |
英文摘要 | Theory predicts that when managers hold less equity in the firm, incentives arise for managers to pursue non-value-maximizing behavior such as shirking and perquisite taking. It is induced that compensation contract often contains accounting-based constraints, to restrict managers' value-reducing behavior when ownership and control are distinct. However, demand for accounting-based constraints is predictably higher when managerial ownership declines and, accordingly, managers are expected to respond to the contractual environment in their self-interest. This paper allows for the existence of observable but noncontractible information and study how price and reported earnings are used in the compensation contract to recover this noncontractible information for contracting purposes. In this framework, our model show the manager's optimal market order and the equilibrium linear pricing rule. Our findings are: (1)In our setting, price is a sufficient statistic for price and reported earnings, with respect to the firm's cash flow. Therefore, the principal in designing the compensation contract does not place weight on reported earnings merely to extract cash flow information from price. (2)The higher the realized gross cash flow, the greater is the manager's demand for shares. (3)The more earnings overstates realized gross cash flow, the smaller is the manager's demand (4)The manager's demand rule does depend on his actual effort choice, and the effort choice is related to the manager holds shares in the firm prior to trading. (5)The manager's demand is related to the effect of total market demand on price. (6)The more liquid the market, the larger is the absolute value of the manager's speculative trade. The reason for this is that the more liquid the market, the less the manager affects price through his trades. (7)The actual cash flow is closer to the manager's effort, the smaller is the manager's demand for shares. (8)The higher the precision of accounting earnings, the smaller is the manager's demand. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。