頁籤選單縮合
題名 | Corporate Ownership Structure and CEO Compensation= |
---|---|
作者 | Lin,Ying-fen; Liu,Victor Wei-chi; |
期刊 | 中山管理評論 |
出版日期 | 19970600 |
卷期 | 5(特刊) 民86.06 |
頁次 | 頁75-91 |
分類號 | 494 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | CEO compensation; Ownership; Agency theory; |
英文摘要 | The purposes of this study are to examine accurately the relation between CEO compensation and company performance, and to test of pay determination across McEachern's (1975) three-way ownership classification as well as on the characteristics of Owner-Managed firms. Using a sample of 88 manufacturing firms list on the market, this study concludes the following results: (1) CEO compensation in Managed-controlled firm is influenced heavily by the size of the company. (2) In Owner-Managed firms, the jobs of CEOs are fairly secure and company performance has a great impact on CEO compensation. This supports the convergence-of-interest hypothesis put forth by Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988) which stated that giving managers an interest in the stock of the company will merge shareholders and CEOs' interests. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。