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題 名 | 物理論與感質=Physicalism and Qualia |
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作 者 | 黃懿梅; | 書刊名 | 國立臺灣大學哲學論評 |
卷 期 | 13 1990.01[民79.01] |
頁 次 | 頁161-184 |
專 輯 | 當代西方哲學:理性與真理研討會專號 |
分類號 | 161 |
關鍵詞 | 物理論; 感質; 哲學; 心靈; 耐格; 傑克森; 知識論; Thomas Nagel; F. Jackson; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
英文摘要 | Any reductive analysis of the mental cannot captural the subjective character of experience. So the qualia is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of physical states. This paper includes three parts. 1. T. Nagel`s what it is like argument` and F. Jackson`s `knowledge argument` argue that physicalism cannot give any explanation of the subjective qualities of our experiences and any physical informations cannot explain what red looks like. 2. An analysis and critique of the defenses of physicalism. 3. The argument against physicalism (identity theory) is an invalid argument. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。