查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 依新功能理論檢驗歐盟尚無共同能源政策之癥結=Neo-Functionalism and the EU'S Lack of Common Energy Policy: An Empirical Case Study |
---|---|
作 者 | 王國璋; | 書刊名 | 美歐季刊 |
卷 期 | 14:1=137 民89.春 |
頁 次 | 頁1-33 |
分類號 | 554.68 |
關鍵詞 | 新功能主義; 越界作用; 能源政策; 歐盟; 核能共同體; 國際能源總署; 能源單一市場; 超國家主義; 國家間主義; Neo-functionalism; Spillover; Energy policy; European union; Euratom; International energy agency; Internal energy market; Supranationalism; Intergovernmentalism; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文研究之目的,在依新功能理論(Neo-Functionalism)檢驗為何歐盟迄今尚無與經貿關係密切的一般能源底共同政策。歐盟區域整合的開端者是煤鋼共同體(ECSC),利用其超國家的組織,管理共同市場下能源之「煤」的產銷,甚為成功。可是當由煤而越界或廣化至「核能」發朧等和平用途時,由於核能國施主義的情結作祟,以致核能共同體(Euratom)的整合作用不進則退。加以核能發膧的安全及環何等與時俱增的新問題之困擾,終致核能共同體未能產生預期的越界作用(spillover),導致無核能共同市場。故而足證新功能論的廣博性及充分性均頗有問題。 六○年代中期以後,直至八○年代中期,西歐區域整合的演進,呈現停滯狀態。因此學人們乃就新功能論的缺失提出批評。其中以哈佛大學Andrew Moravcsick教授提出的「開明的政府間談判妥協的研究論」,以濟新功能論之窮,最為中肯。其論點是:第一層次為各成員國的政策偏好(preferences),乃由國內政治議題及共識,和區域內彼此經濟的相互依存而產生的限制與機會,促成其為共同的利益而談判,然後彼此再運用其討價還價的權力,折衷調合各自的政策偏好,從事多贏的妥協,整合出「各因其私,乃全其公」的成果。 能源對歐盟單一市場下的經貿功能之廣化及深化關係密切,但終因各成員國間的能源結構及政策彼此差異太大,而它們的政府及能源利益團體,固執地視能源議題涉及國家之重大利益,而不肯妥協合作,以致九二年的促成歐盟廣化及深化的馬斯垂克條約中無「能源條款」,作為執委會推動共同能源政策的法律依據。歐以執委會能源部只能利用八六年答定的單一市場條約的規定,間托地對一般能源作分項式的個別規劃,以期先促成技術性的合合作此種枝節性的合作改進,就共同之能源市場及政策而言,形成經濟及市場整合中之一大缺口。因此,整合的前提是政府間的談判及妥協與共識,乃區域整合的幕後動力,而區域整合促成的超國家組合乃表象而已。准此,則未來有關區整合理論的進一步發展 必須能說明區域整合演進中,政府鋹義與超國主義兩種力量的互動和消長,以及其彼此「相反相成」的相關性及預估性,將兩者統合為一,綜合出一個實證的中程理論來,始可有濟也。 |
英文摘要 | The purpose of this study is to analyze why the EU still has no common energy policy, because this is contrary to the theory of neo-functionalism and the integration of a wider Single European Market to which energy is of crucial importance. Two models of bargaining are evident in policy process surrounding the implementation of the Internal Market in the area of the energy sector. One starts from a common interest in the realization of an EU energy common market and policy, which reflects the process of functional spillover. The Commission seeks to exploit and build on this common interest to propose energy title in the Maastricht Treaty and, later, in the Intergovernmental Conferences. However, such attempts have so far failed. Thus, it is impossible to treat integration as a self-contained process as the neo-functionalists advocate. This also raises serious questions about the comprehensiveness and adequacy of the integration theory of neo-functionalism. The other bargaining mode of the intergovernmental approach involves the reconciliation of divergent interests which stems from different energy perspectives and infrastructures in the EU Member States, and the impulse to defend elements of national energy policies which are inimical to Internal Market principles. Thus, the Commission seeks to balance the interests arising among Member States in the energy sector so as to trade interests and to build consensus in the Council of Ministers for the purpose of passing EU regulations or directives in the energy field. However this attempt has also failed thus far due to the fact that the divergent energy interests among Member States are almost impossible to compromise at the domestic, intergovernmental, and sectoral levels. Therefore, present EU panning in the internal energy market has been a piecemeal approach, lacking a common policy. As described above, missing is a comprehensive middle range theory to explain the EU integration and policy-making. Such a theory should synthesize both the neo-functionalism and the liberal intergovernmentalist approach in terms of variables and their inter relationship in order to maximize predicative power. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。