查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 審計委員會特質與銀行業盈餘管理行為之關聯性=The Relationship between Characteristics of the Audit Committee and a Bank's Earnings Management |
---|---|
作 者 | 李貴富; 廖懿屏; 李娟菁; 潘思方; | 書刊名 | 會計與財金研究 |
卷 期 | 8:1 2015.03[民104.03] |
頁 次 | 頁63-74 |
分類號 | 495.9 |
關鍵詞 | 審計委員會; 盈餘管理; 裁決性呆帳; Audit committee; Earnings management; Discretionary loan loss provision; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 近年來,主管機關逐漸傾向強制設置審計委員會(尤英夫,2007;薛明玲,2013),因此,有系統地探究審計委員會之何種特質能有效降低財報不實,可謂當務之急。本研究針對2008年至2012年台灣銀行業公司之資料,以裁決性呆帳費用為盈餘管理之代理變數(Kanagaretnam et al., 2010),探討審計委員會之各項特質對銀行業之盈餘管理行為是否有抑制效果。實證結果發現,審計委員會之規模越大、開會次數越多、平均出席率越高、或任期較短,銀行之裁決性呆帳費用受到向下操縱之可能性越低。本研究之貢獻包括:(1)作為國內首篇針對金融業樣本,進行審計委員會特質及盈餘管理行為關聯性之檢驗的研究,及時補足文獻之不足,(2)實證結果所呈現之各項重要特質,可供主管機關訂定銀行業之審計委員會各項規範之參考。 |
英文摘要 | The regulator has tended to make the setup of an audit committee mandatory in recent years (Yu, 2007; Xue, 2013). Therefore, it is necessary to understand how each characteristic of an audit committee affects financial misreporting. Based on data from Taiwan banks from 2008 to 2012, this study uses the discretionary loan loss provision expense as the proxy for a bank's earnings management (Kanagaretnam et al., 2010) and examines whether the audit committee decreases a bank's tendency to manipulate its earnings. The empirical results indicate that when an audit committee is comprised of more members, the meeting frequency or the average attendance rate is higher, or the average tenure is shorter, the bank's discretionary loan loss provision is less manipulated. The study makes contributions in the following way. First, it is the first to systematically examine the relationship between characteristics of an audit committee and a bank's earning management behavior. Second, the regulator may take into account the characteristics documented in this study as a benchmark when evaluating the soundness of a bank's audit committee. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。