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來源資料
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題 名 | 公司治理對盈餘預測之影響=The Impact of Corporate Governance on Earnings Forecasts |
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作 者 | 張椿柏; 王育偉; 吳欣于; 葉哲瑋; | 書刊名 | 財金論文叢刊 |
卷 期 | 27 2017.12[民106.12] |
頁 次 | 頁19-33 |
分類號 | 563.54 |
關鍵詞 | 盈餘預測; 公司治理; 代理問題; Earnings forecasts; Corporate governance; Agency problem; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本研究主要檢視公司治理與盈餘預測誤差之關聯,本研究採多元迴歸分析,以2005年至2015年所有台灣上市(櫃)公司為樣本,並將代理問題加以區分為權益代理問題與核心代理問題,探討公司股權結構,董事會特性對盈餘預測誤差之影響。實證結果如下:(1)管理者持股與盈餘預測誤差呈負向顯著關係,支持利益收斂假說。(2)控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈大,盈餘預測誤差愈大。(3)盈餘預測誤差會隨董監持股比率、機構投資人持股比率及獨立董監事比率而減少,但會因董監事持股質押比率及董事長兼任總經理而增加。 |
英文摘要 | The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of corporate governance on earnings forecasts errors. The sample of the study consists of public companies in Taiwan for the period from 2005 to 2015. The main feature of this study is that we divide agency problem into core agency problem and equity agency problem, and we explore the relation between ownership structure, board characteristics and earnings forecasts errors. Overall, this paper expects to explain corporate governance can reduce agency problem and the efficient corporate governance can decrease earnings forecasts errors. The empirical results indicate as follows : First, managerial ownership is negatively related to earnings forecasts errors and hence supports convergence-of-interest hypothesis. Second, as controlling right deviates from cash flow right, earnings forecasts errors is getting worse, that is, core agency problems become more serious in the firm. Finally, the shares of board directors, the shares of institutional investor and the proportion of independent directors have negative relationship with earnings forecasts errors, but the pledged share ratio of directors and chairman served CEO have positive relationship with earnings forecasts errors. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。