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題 名 | The Relationship between R&D Capitalization and Subsequent R&D Investment Decisions: The Monitoring Role of the Board of Directors=研發資本化與研發投資效率之關聯性研究:兼論董事會之監督角色 |
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作 者 | 蔡柳卿; 楊朝旭; 陳家慧; 許慧雯; | 書刊名 | 中華會計學刊 |
卷 期 | 10:2 2014.12[民103.12] |
頁 次 | 頁99-134 |
分類號 | 494.7 |
關鍵詞 | 研發資本化; 投資效率; 董事會; R&D capitalization; Investment efficiency; Board of directors; |
語 文 | 英文(English);中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 研發資本化的支持者一向認為,研發支出費用化將誘發短視的管理者藉由削減研發費用,以操縱短期利潤,導致研發投資不足的現象。然而,本研究認為研發資本化並非萬靈丹。使用2007年至2010年美國軟體業公司為樣本,本研究為首篇利用大樣本執行實證研究,提供證據指出研發資本化將導致後續研發之過度投資。此證據支持下列觀點:選擇研發支出資本化的管理者,基於聲譽考量,即使研發方案已經前景黯淡,寧願繼續投資也不願意報導研發資產減損,進而導致研發過度投資。此外,本研究進一步分析發現,有效的董事會監督可抑制前述管理者研發投資過度的行為。 |
英文摘要 | Proponents of the R&D capitalization method have long argued that expensing R&D incentivizes myopic managers to cut R&D to manage short-term profits, leading to underinvestment in R&D. However, we argue that R&D capitalization is not a panacea. Using a sample of U.S. software firms from 2007 to 2010, we document the first archival empirical evidence that R&D capitalization can lead to subsequent over-investment in R&D. This finding is consistent with the view that, to save their reputation, managers of R&D capitalizing firms are reluctant to report impairment of capitalized R&D. Consequently, capitalizing firms tend to continue those R&D projects with bleak prospects and thus over-invest in R&D. A further analysis indicates that effective monitoring from a firm's board of directors can discipline managers for overinvestment in R&D. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。