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題名 | Limit-Pricing and Learning-By-Doing: A Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information= |
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作者 | Yang, Ke; |
期刊 | International Journal of Business and Economics |
出版日期 | 20101200 |
卷期 | 9:3 2010.12[民99.12] |
頁次 | 頁201-212 |
分類號 | 494.7 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | Limit-pricing; Learning-by-doing; Dynamic game; |
英文摘要 | Abstract We study a firm's pricing/output strategy under threat of entry in a two-period game with asymmetric information, where the firm can reduce future cost through learning-by-doing. In contrast with previous literature, we show that a firm's incentive to reduce cost through higher production may not align with its incentive to signal its cost type. As a consequence, in equilibrium, the incumbent firm might distort its price upward instead of downward. |
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