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題名 | Optimal Licensing Strategy: Royalty or Fixed Fee? |
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作者 | Fosfuri, Andrea; Roca, Esther; | 書刊名 | International Journal of Business and Economics |
卷期 | 3:1 民93.04 |
頁次 | 頁13-19 |
分類號 | 555.9 |
關鍵詞 | Licensing contract; Cournot competition; Strategic effects; |
語文 | 英文(English) |
英文摘要 | Licensing a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to licensing by means of a fixed fee for an incumbent licensor. This note shows that this result relies crucially on the assumption that the incumbent licensor can sell its cost-reducing inno-vation to all industry players. If, for any reason, only some competitors could be reached through a licensing contract, then a fixed fee might be optimally chosen. |
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