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題 名 | 巴門尼德斯前篇與參與問題=Parmenides I and the Problem of Participation |
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作 者 | 俞懿嫻; | 書刊名 | 東海學報 |
卷 期 | 40:1(文學院) 民88.07 |
頁 次 | 頁203-241 |
分類號 | 141.4 |
關鍵詞 | 柏拉圖哲學; 巴門尼德斯; 理型論; 亞里士多德; 希臘哲學; Plato; Parmenides; Aristotle; Greek philosophy; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 柏拉圖的《巴門尼德斯篇》(Parmenides)一直是令學者困惑難以理解的語錄。 柏拉圖為什麼在由錄的前篇(126a-135d)裡對他的理型論提出嚴厲的批判?他是否因此而 放棄了這個主要的學說?發展觀者認為的確因為《巴門尼德斯》前篇提出理型論的問題,難 以解決,使得柏拉圖晚期放棄了理型論;統一觀者則認為柏拉圖思想有其一貫性,《巴門尼 德斯》前篇提出有關理型論的困難,並不足全盤否定該理論。本文採取統一觀學者的立場, 藉著探討《巴門尼德斯》前篇以及其中的該心概念「參與」(participation),從兩種層 面來瞭解該語錄的定位。就第一個層面而言,根據柏拉圖在《非獨篇》(Phaedo)與《共和 國篇》(Republic)中提出的理型論,理型是永恆不變、獨立自存的事物原型(archetypes ),理解的對象(intelligible objects), 與感覺世界絕然分離。感覺事物藉著模仿、參 與理型,以取得其自身性質與存在。而由於理型論區分處於變遷之流的現行感覺世界與永恆 不變的超越理型世界,於是造成兩者之間如何關聯的困難。以「參與」或「模仿」描寫兩者的關係,只能說是一種比譬說詞(analogy), 難以確定亡的實質意義。柏拉圖的《巴門尼 德斯》前篇正是對於這個問題的反省,而亞里士多德日後對理型論的修正與批評,也多出於 相同理由。就第二個層面而言,在《巴門尼德斯篇》裡,由於「參與」的概念遭到批評,往 往把理型的形質化或物質化(materialized)作為前提,而柏拉圖原則上將理型看作是不具 形質的、精神理想的對象,對於理型被物質化而產生的後果當然不以為意。正是這個緣故, 本文認為《巴門尼德斯篇》對理型論的批評,在柏拉圖看來並不足造成理型論的致命傷,也 沒有理由因此而放棄理型論。他在晚期語錄裡繼續理型論的發展,也是可以理解的。 |
英文摘要 | Through thousands of years Plato's Parmenides remains an enigma that puzzles all its students and interpreters. Why Plato, in the first part of the dialogue (1261-135d, hereafter Parmenides I), mounted a series of remorseless attacks on the pith of his philosophy, the theory of Ideas? Did he eventually give up this theory which provides a systematic foundation to all his thought, because of the insurmountable difficulties laid out in the dialogue? Among the contemporary Platonic scholars, the developmentalists believe that Plato, in the later years of his life, had indeed forsaken his theory of Ideas. And in opposition to this view the unitarians argue that the largely coherency of the rest of Plato's dialogues indication the theory had never been abandoned and the difficulties raised by the Parmenides I had never been fatal ones. Taking Plato's dialogues as a whole, the present paper intends to adopt a unitarian view and thereby to inquire into the core concept of the dialogue, "participation," with two emphases. First of all, the theory of Ideas appeared in the Phaedo and the Republic suggests that there is a realm of eternal, changeless, intelligible objects, i.e. Ideas, which are the archetypes of all existences divorced from and independent of the phenomenal world. The particular sensible things the phenomenal world acquire their nature and existence by modeling after Ideas that are immutable and absolute realities. The "two-world" ontology given by the theory of Ideas separates the changeless Ideas from the transient world of phenomenta in order to secure their universality and objectivity, however at the same time makes the relation between the two a most troublesome problem. Plato attempts to explain their relation in terms of Participation or Imitation that Aristotle sees to be meaningless poetic metaphors. Obviously, Parmenides I serving as a philosophical reflection on Plato's own part was meant to deal with this critical issue and Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of Ideas was deeply influenced by it. Secondly, the arguments against the concept of Participation stated in the Parmenides I are consistently supported by the presuppostion of the materialization of the Ideas. While in Plato's view the Ideas are incorporeal beings and intelligible objects beyond any physical descriptions and sould never be materialized. Bearing this in mind it may well be argued that Plato would have ever considered the criticisms raised in the Parmenides I irremediable damages to his theory of Ideas, if he had not continue to work on its development in his late dialogues. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。