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題名 | 對局理論應用於解制電力市場之獨立發電業者機組維修策略=Game Theory Applied to Units Maintenance Strategies for the Independent Power Producers in De-regulated Power Market |
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作 者 | 謝宗煌; | 書刊名 | 中華技術學院學報 |
卷期 | 34 民95.06 |
頁次 | 頁91-103 |
分類號 | 448.115 |
關鍵詞 | 獨立系統操作機構; 不完整資訊; 聶徐均衡; Independent system operator; Incomplete information; Nash equilibrium; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 電業自由化之後,獨立發電業者必須向由獨立系統操作(Independent System Operator, ISO)機構提報機組維修時段,發電業者欲求取最大獲利其必須審慎的規劃機組維修時段。 一般電力市場的機制是由ISO接受發電業者售電的投標電價,然後依標單的最低價格逐漸上升調度發電機組之發電量直到滿足負載所需,本文假設發電成本為完全資訊,但是機組維修策略為不完整資訊(impact information),發電業者以非合作對局的模式互相競爭,並且應用聶徐均衡(Nash Equilibrium)解此問題,本文以範例說明所提的方法並且分析投標策略與檢修排程策略對獲利的影響。研究顯示以電量需求與供給比來調整投標策略,安排最佳維修時段以估算現貨電價,進而求得最佳之期望獲利,更符合市場活動的機制。 |
英文摘要 | After the electrical power liberalization, the independent Power Producers (IPPs) should be submitting the unit maintenance schedule to the independent system operator (ISO). In order to maximum the profit, the IPPs plan unit maintenance time interval punctiliously. In generally, the electrical power market is that the ISO accept bidding price from IPPs then the ISO dispatch power generation level from the lowest price gradually rises until satisfy the load demand. This paper assumed that the generation cost function is complete information, but the strategy of maintenance schedule is incomplete information. This is a non-cooperation game model and competition between the IPPs. This problem is solved by Nash Equilibrium. There is an example to explain the proposed methods and proceeded analysis the bidding price, unit maintenance schedule strategy and the profits of IPPs. The results show that base on the electric quantity demand and the supplies ratio to adjust the bidding strategy, then arrangement applicable unit maintenance time interval that can obtain the best expectation profit. That is conformed to the marketing campaign mechanism. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。