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題名 | 勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型=Lobbying by Labor and Capital Over Tariff Protection |
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作者姓名(中文) | 吳依芳; 王智賢; | 書刊名 | 經社法制論叢 |
卷期 | 36 民94.07 |
頁次 | 頁199-241 |
分類號 | 556.7 |
關鍵詞 | 工會; 遊說; 關稅保護; Union; Lobby; Tariff protection; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 大部份的工會遊說文獻,假設工會的目標函數受就業量與工資影響,且影響方向為正。但在真實世界中其實不僅止於此,吾人觀察國際工會運動,發現工會亦重視產品的國內價格。本文以Wang, Koo and Chen (2005) 的模型為基礎,加入工會對國內產品價格的關心,並探討工會和廠商的遊說行為,將對貿易政策產生何種影響,產品的國內價格又如何變動。另外,亦嘗試找尋遊說賽局的子賽局完美均衡,並與只有廠商遊說的情況比較。吾人發現工會加入遊說競賽,對消費者福利是提昇還是減損並無法確定,須視勞工參與工會的比例高低及對手部門而定。不過可以肯定,聯合工會(跨產業的工會)的出現,對消費者來說,不蒂是一項福音。 |
英文摘要 | The literature on lobbying always assumes that the objective function of a union is positively affected by employment and wage, which ignores a significant truth in a real world. Observing the international union movement, we can find the unions also value the domestic prices of the products. This paper is based on Wang, Koo and Chen (2005). We try to emphasize the concern of the unions about the domestic prices and explore the influences of the trade policies due to the lobbying behaviors by unions and industries. Compared to the lobbying race between industries, what is the change of the domestic prices? And what are the subgame perfect equilibriums of the lobbying games? It is found that with the participation of the unions, we may not know whether consumers become better off, which depends on the ratios of the labors' participation in the union and rival sectors. But it is quite sure that the presence of the united union, a cross-sector union, is good news to consumers. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。