頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 均衡研發聯盟形成規則與政府之最適選擇=Research Joint Venture Formation Rule and the Government's Optimum Choice |
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作者 | 徐學忍; Hsu, Hsueh-jen; |
期刊 | 公平交易季刊 |
出版日期 | 19970400 |
卷期 | 5:2 1997.04[民86.04] |
頁次 | 頁1-31 |
分類號 | 555.77 |
語文 | chi |
關鍵詞 | 研發策略聯盟; 政府; |
英文摘要 | This paper analyzes the equilibrium size and optimal size of research joint venture (RJV) under open membership rule and restricted entry rule. Three assumptions are made here: there is only one RJV; research is for the objective of reducing cost: and there exist intra-industry spill-over effects of innovation result. In the conventional closed market case, under open membership rule the coalition size is far greater than the socially optimal size. However, under the restricted entry rule the coalition size is closer to the socially optimal size. So, the later rule is consistent with the spirit of the Fair Trade Law. But in open market case, under open membership rule the coalition size may come closer to the socially optimal size. With restricted entry rule the coalition size may be far less than the socially optimal size, and the restricted entry rule is not consistent with the Fair Trade Law. |
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