頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 公民投票法的制度設計=Institutional Arrangement of the Citizen Lawmaking Act |
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作者姓名(中文) | 陳英鈐; | 書刊名 | 臺灣民主季刊 |
卷期 | 1:2 2004.06[民93.06] |
頁次 | 頁73-93 |
專輯 | 公投的實踐與民主政治 |
分類號 | 581.236 |
關鍵詞 | 創制; 複決; 公民投票; 國民主權; 防衛性公投; Initiative; Referendum; Citizen ballot; People's sovereignty; Defensive referendum; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 中華民國憲法規定一種直接民主與間接民主混合的半直接民主體制,其中人民的創制複決權之行使,直到2003年底公民投票法的制定才得以落實。本文基於憲法半直接民主的精神檢視公民投票法的制度設計。基於國民主權的原則,涉及中華民國主權之移轉或變更,毋怠憲法或法律之規定,人民可要求複決。若不變更國民主權,要制定新的憲法,因涉及社會契約(憲法)的變更,也應有公民複決,才能強化憲法變更的正當性。解釋上,現行中華民國憲法體制,並不排除人民針對憲法的修改提出創制或複決的要求。公投法僅規定人民對於法律原則的創制,適用上不無爭議。至於重大政策的公投,將產生何種效果,仍不明確。備受爭議的防衛性公投,與總統決定國家安全的大政方針之憲法精神並不抵觸。至於立法院發動公投的規定,則與憲法權力分立設計的精神不盡吻合。公投門檻的限制,恐將阻礙半直接民主的落實。公民投票審議委員會的設計則有侵犯總統人事任命權之虞。 |
英文摘要 | The constitution of the R.O.C. creates a half direct democracy by mixing the elements of direct and indirect democracy. The people, however, are not able to claim their rights to initiative and referendum until the Citizen Lawmaking Act (CLA) was passed at the end of 2003. This essay will examine the institutional arrangements of this new law in the spirit of half direct democracy. According to the principle of popular sovereignty, the people may request a vote on the transfer or change of the state's sovereignty, whether it is enshrined in the constitution or not. When the state's sovereignty remains unchanged, making a new constitution involves rewriting the social contract (i.e. the constitution). It should therefore be submitted to the vote of the people in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the new constitution. The effective constitution does not prohibit the people from revising the constitution by way of initiative and referendum. The CLA merely provides an initiative in the form of a general suggestion to make a new law, and its application is quite dubious. As far as the citizen is called on to vote on public policy, the effect of such a vote is difficult to determine. The contentious "defensive referendum" is commensurable with the spirit of the constitution, which empowers the president to make fundamental decisions in matters of national security. It is contrary to the principle of separation of powers, as the Legislative Yuan may ask the people to vote on drafts. It is of some concern that the many thresholds installed in the CLA may alienate the spirit of half direct democracy. The Referendum Examination Commission encroaches the president's constitutional right to nominate all executive personnel. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。