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題 名 | 制度選擇如何可能:論日本之選舉制度改革=How Can an Institution End Itself: The Case of Japan's Electoral Reform |
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作 者 | 林繼文; | 書刊名 | 臺灣政治學刊 |
卷 期 | 2 1997.12[民86.12] |
頁 次 | 頁63-106 |
分類號 | 574.3133 |
關鍵詞 | 日本; 選舉制度; Single nontransferable voting system under multi-member district; SNTV-MMD; Electoral reform; Japanese politics; Party realignment; Rational choice theory; Spatial model; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 歷來關於「多人區單記非讓渡投票制」的研究,多著重於其比例性或政治後果,而較少論及制度選擇的問題。當日本於 1994 年初將該制改為「小選區比例代表並立制」後,既有研究多將其歸因於民眾對於現有體制的不滿。這種看法並不能解釋改革成功的時機 (同樣的改革提案在早先一再挫敗 ),也不能解釋改革的結果為何偏向小選區制而非比例代表制。本研究將制度選擇視為個別行動者策略互動的結果,提出一個新的思考方向。首先,本研究援引空間模型提出基本命題:現狀穩定的充要條件,在於其「全方中位性」。其次,根據此一定理導出三項關於選舉制度改革的假說:(1) 改革必須和其他議題同時提出才可能成功;(2) 改革須在沒有政黨席次過半的情形下才可能成功;(3) 改革為多案競爭,但其軌跡是可以預測的。日本的選舉制度改革印證了這些假說。自民黨在一黨獨大時,曾數次提案改變選舉制度,但都徒勞無功。真正使選制改革進入議程的是兩項因素:(1) 自民黨的分裂;(2) 選制改革成為政界重組的議題之一。最後的結果,反映了革新政黨與自民黨對於小選區制的偏好,但新制度本身也不必然是穩定的。 |
英文摘要 | Existing studies on single nontransferable voting system under multi- member district (SNTV-MMD) have focused mainly on its proportionality and consequences and paid little attention to its changeablility. When Japan did replace it with a new electoral system in 1994, most works ascribed the reform to the discontent toward corruption induced by the old system. Such a theory accounted for neither the timing nor the outcome of the reform. This article provides a different explanation by treating institutional choice as a result of strategic interaction among individual politicians. Extending a fundamental theorem in spatial theory, we propose a general proposition regarding the possibility of electoral reform: the status quo system is irreplaceable if and only if it is a median in all directions. We then ascertain two initial conditions whereby the proposition can be applied: that SNTV-MMD is roughly the median regarding the proportionality of electoral systems and that the system induces divergent preferences againist itself. Three hypotheses are then derived: (1)SNTV-MMD is irreplaceable if the reform is not associated with other issues, (2) SNTV-MMD is irreplaceable if some party controls the majority of seats, (3)whenever the status quo is irreplaceable, there is more than one viable alternative. These propositions are corroborated by the Japanese experience. Attempts to change SNTV-MMD failed until the LDP broke up and electoral reform became an indispensable issue in Japan's party realignment. The final bill also reflected the common interest of the LDP and the new parties on the single-member district system. However, the stability of the new system is affected by the same logic that this study portrays. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。