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題 名 | Two-Level Games between Rival Regimes: Domestic Politics and the Remaking of Cross-Strait Relations |
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作 者 | 林繼文; | 書刊名 | Issues & Studies |
卷 期 | 36:6 民89.11-12 |
頁 次 | 頁1-26 |
分類號 | 573.09 |
關鍵詞 | Two-level games; Robert D. putnam; Cross-strait relations; Linkage politics; Democratic peace; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
英文摘要 | This article develops a two-level game model to depict the sovereignty dispute across the Taiwan Strait. It shows that dissatisfaction with the status quo undermines cross-Strait stability, and that a moderate leader besieged by hard-liners in a nondemocratic regime reacts most radically to external pressures. These arguments are then empirically verified. Such findings deviate from Robert Putnam's claim that international cooperation is enhanced by a greater domestic demand to change the status quo, and also call for a distinction between two-level games that are zero-sum and nonzero-sum. By implication, the author suggests that cross-Strait stability can be improved by concurrent power transitions, centripetal political institutions, and a nonzero-sum distribution of payoffs. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。