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題 名 | 從「權力授予」概念看臺灣的行政立法互動關係:以八十七年預算法修正為例=Taiwan's Executive-Legislative Relations from the "Delegation of Power" Perspective: Using 1998 Budget Act Reform as an Example |
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作 者 | 陳敦源; 徐仁輝; | 書刊名 | 空大行政學報 |
卷 期 | 10 2000.06[民89.06] |
頁 次 | 頁155-186 |
分類號 | 571.7、571.7 |
關鍵詞 | 權力授予; 行政立法關係; 代理人理論; 預算法; 國會改革; Delegation of power; Executive-legislative relations; Agency theory; Budget act; Congressional reform; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 「權力授予」(delegationofpower)是任何民主憲政體制所共有的現象,也是行憲歷程中行政立法互動的核'心;然而,我國面對重大政策爭議時,不是為「內閣制vs總統制,軌優孰劣?」的問題所掩蓋、就是執迷在「專業決策」民主決策,軌重孰鏈?」的泥沼中,一方面造成我們習慣性地尋找修憲途徑來解決政策爭議,另一方也不斷以專業真理來對抗民主決策中的民粹要素,這兩種解決政策爭議的直覺反應,對於吾國憲政體制的實質發展並與助益。本文試圖從「權力授予」的角度,重新檢視我國行政立法關係運作的內涵,並以民國87年預算法修正為例,展現我國民主化進程中,有關榷力授予制度變遷的實況,以期建立觀察台灣未來行政立法關係各項制度發展的核心理論。 本文首先由引介新制度經濟學的「代理人」理論(agencytheory)出發,指出一一般行政立法關係制度選擇所要面對約三項重要問題: (1)多重代理人、(2)多重委託人與(3)不對稱的制衡關係。按著,本文再以代理人理論為核心,討論我國行政立法授權關係制度選擇的邏輯,並從中發掘解釋我國行政立法關係發展的關鍵因素:由行政權獨佔的現實與一黨獨大的矛盾所產生的「不行動假定」(inactionhypothesis)的問題,行政機關在行政立法的授權關係上,除非必要時刻,維持現狀是獲致權力極大化的主要策略,這是我國目前行政立法制度運作的特性;最後,我們從最近一次預算法修正的過程中,首先簡述吾國預算法結構變遷的歷史,並依據上述理論對此次的修正提出分析,讓理論於實例中得到印證;在結論中,我們提出從權力授予觀點出發的國會改革建議。 |
英文摘要 | "Delegation of power" is at the heart of every constitutional democracy. The idea isalso the essence of executive-legislative relations in any democratic polity. In Taiwan,discussion related to this concept is rarely seen. As a result, when we face an importantpolicy debate, we usually consider it to be caused either by the failure of our semipresidential system, or by the conflict between professionalism and populism in theprocess of public decision-making. In fact, most policy conflicts between executive andlegislative branches can be seen as the legislators reconsider their power-delegating activities to the executive. In this paper, we use the agency theory from the newinstitutional economics in particular to reveal the Taiwan's executive-legislative relationsfrom the "delegation of power" perspective. According to these theories, we first point out three problems to be solved in theexecutive delegation relations: (1) multiple agents; (2) multiple principals; (3)asymmetric check-and-balance relations. Then, we establish an "inaction hypothesis" which infers thatin general the executive can maximize its power in the executivelegislative relations by holding the status quo. It can be used to examine individual eventconcerning executive-legislative relations on Taiwan. By using 1998 Budget Act reformas an example, we demonstrate the inner logic of our executive-legislative interactions.Finally, we rethink three conceptual issues concerning the problems of congressionalreform from the "delegation of power" perspective. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。