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| 題 名 | 東アジアにおける憲法裁判制度と司法の変容--韓国を中心に=東亞憲法裁判制度與司法變遷--以韓國為中心、Constitutional Court Systems and Judicial Transformation in East Asia: The Case of South Korea |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 國分典子; | 書刊名 | 輔仁法學 |
| 卷 期 | 65 2023.06[民112.06] |
| 頁 次 | 頁477-513 |
| 分類號 | 581.32 |
| 關鍵詞 | 憲法裁判所; 大法院; 管轄權; 限定違憲決定; 政治司法化; Constitutional Court; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Conditional unconstitutionality; Judicialization of politics; 管轄権; 政治の司法化; |
| 語 文 | 日文(Japanese) |
| 中文摘要 | 韓國憲法裁判所具備具體的規範統制、彈劾審判、解散政黨審判、權限爭議審判、憲法訴願審判之權限。憲法裁判所因為沒有抽象規範統制權限，被認為與國會、政府、大法院相當地位。但是，關於憲法裁判所的權限，產生以下的問題。首先是憲法裁判所與大法院的摩擦。藉由違憲審查，憲法裁判所所做的決定拘束所有的政府機關。另外一方面，法院作為司法機關擁有法律解釋之權限的關係，憲法裁判所就特定法律做出「如果是按照〇〇這樣解釋的話，是違憲的」的判斷（限定違憲決定），而非單純的違憲無效之決定的情形，法院是否會受到該決定的拘束即產生問題。大法院對此採取這樣的憲法裁判所之解釋不拘束的見解，由此產生大法院與憲法裁判所的摩擦。第二個問題是政治的司法化。特別是彈劾審判、政黨解散審判、權限爭議審判帶來政治的司法化現象，對統治結構也帶來變化。台灣的司法架構雖然與韓國有所不同，但是透過本文對於韓國個案的討論，對於將憲法裁判制度導入的台灣而言，也提供了一定的啟示。｜韓國憲法裁判所具備具體的規範統制、彈劾審判、解散政黨審判、權限爭議審判、憲法訴願審判之權限。憲法裁判所因為沒有抽象規範統制權限，被認為與國會、政府、大法院相當地位。但是，關於憲法裁判所的權限，產生以下的問題。首先是憲法裁判所與大法院的摩擦。藉由違憲審查，憲法裁判所所做的決定拘束所有的政府機關。另外一方面，法院作為司法機關擁有法律解釋之權限的關係，憲法裁判所就特定法律做出「如果是按照〇〇這樣解釋的話，是違憲的」的判斷（限定違憲決定），而非單純的違憲無效之決定的情形，法院是否會受到該決定的拘束即產生問題。大法院對此採取這樣的憲法裁判所之解釋不拘束的見解，由此產生大法院與憲法裁判所的摩擦。第二個問題是政治的司法化。特別是彈劾審判、政黨解散審判、權限爭議審判帶來政治的司法化現象，對統治結構也帶來變化。台灣的司法架構雖然與韓國有所不同，但是透過本文對於韓國個案的討論，對於將憲法裁判制度導入的台灣而言，也提供了一定的啟示。 |
| 英文摘要 | This article introduces the evolution of the Constitutional Court of South Korea's power and discusses the issues that have arisen. The Constitutional Court has the following jurisdictions: adjudication on concrete normative control, adjudication on impeachment, adjudication on dissolution of a political party, adjudication on competence disputes, and constitutional complaint trails. The Constitutional Court has no power to adjudicate on abstract normative control. The Constitutional Court is considered to hold a status equivalent to that of the National Assembly, the government, and the Supreme Court. However, the following problems have appeared over the powers of the Constitutional Court. The first problem is the friction between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. The Court's decision of unconstitutionality shall bind the ordinary courts, other state agencies and local governments. On the other hand, since the ordinary courts, as the judicial branch, have the power to legal interpretation. When the Constitutional Court renders judgments like "it is unconstitutional if interpreted in the condition of 〇〇" (conditional unconstitutional decision) instead of a simple declaration of unconstitutionality, the question is arises whether the ordinary Court is bound by such decisions or not. The Constitutional Court and the ordinary courts are going through a fair amount of tension over the modified holdings of "conditional unconstitutionality" and "conditional constitutionality." The Constitutional Court takes the view that these are sub-categories of the decision of unconstitutionality, whereas the ordinary courts argue that they are merely a form of legal interpretation. The difference in their views is causing friction between the two institutions. The second problem is the judicialization of politics. In particular, the constitutional Court's adjudications on impeachment, on dissolution of a political party, and on competence disputes seem to have brought about a situation of "judicialization of politics" and changes in the structure of governing system. Although Taiwan's judicial structure differs from that of South Korea, these South Korean cases may provide some insights for Taiwan, which has introduced a constitutional review system. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。