頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 黑格爾哲學對概念的把握=The Concept of "Concept"(Begriff)in Hegel's Philosophy |
---|---|
作 者 | 楊植勝; | 書刊名 | 人文社會學報. 世新大學 |
卷 期 | 1 1999.05[民88.05] |
頁 次 | 頁193-206 |
分類號 | 147.51 |
關鍵詞 | 概念; 黑格爾; 哲學; 性; Concept; Hegel; Philosophy; Xing; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 黑格爾認為一切哲學的思想都必須以「概念」的形態來表達。但是黑格爾哲學所謂的概念不同於一般及形式邏輯所把握的形式性的概念。形式性的概念是在普遍性�堨慾忝T定的抽象存在,作為一種抽離內容的純粹形式。黑格爾批評這樣的概念是空洞貧乏的,因而是「死」的。黑格爾以其哲學「整體生命的立場」,認為真正的概念是具體的和「活」的,像任何具體的活的東西,可以成長並實現它自己。黑格爾對概念的這種把握,與中國哲學�媥妙a所謂的「性」字近似。 |
英文摘要 | In Hegel's philosophy, the thought can be conceived only by concepts. But the concept in Hegel's philosophy is different from what we generally conceive, esp. the concept in the formal logic. The formal concept, as seperated from the content, is abstract, and hence is not determined in its universality. Hegel thinks that such a concept is poor and empty, and therefore is "dead". What Hegel conceives of concept is bound up with his philosophy of "the life of totality". For him the genuine concept is concrete and "live", which like anything concrete and alive, can grow and realize itself. This concept is similar to the Confucianistic "Xing" in Chinese philosophy. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。