查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題名 | An Investigation of the Effects of the Precision of Audit Technology on Audit Services=審計技術精確性對審計服務影響之剖析 |
---|---|
作者 | 沈維民; Sheng, William W.; |
期刊 | 管理學報 |
出版日期 | 19990900 |
卷期 | 16:3 1999.09[民88.09] |
頁次 | 頁379-402 |
分類號 | 495.9 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 不完全競局; 不完美揭示; 多重客戶型態; Incomplete information game; Imperfect revelation; Multiple client types; |
中文摘要 | 本研究以一個同時允許不完美揭示(imperfect revelation)和多重客戶型態 (multiple client)的不完全資訊競局(incomplete information game)來探討審計人員 (auditor)和簽證客戶(attest client)間的策略互動。本文的主要結論有二:首先,「加強 審計且誠實發布審計報告」是否為一個不受凌駕策略 (undominated strategy),除取決於 不完美揭示參數(t)外,亦取決於:(1)客戶財務報表發生重大錯誤之機率;(2)審計人員之 預期第一類與第二類錯誤成本(expected costs of type Ⅰ and typeⅡ errors)。第二、 本文證明在合適的條件下,前述不受凌駕策略可進一步成為審計人員的一個純粹策略均衡解 (pure strategy equilibrium solution)。此外;本研究與Sheng[1996]之重大區隔乃在於 本文之模型允許「不完美揭示」和「多重客戶型態」並存;而後者之主要結論則是需先排除 「不完美揭示」之可能性後方得以成立。 |
英文摘要 | In this study, an auditor-client incomplete information game is introduced to analyze auditorclient interactions. The model formally recognizes the effect of allowing for imperfect revelation and multiple client types. It is demonstrated that as long as the auditor might "tremble" the result of Sheng[1996] may not hold anymore. More importantly, the result of this study helps identify the additional conditions needed to guarantee the auditor's "standard" strategy of extending the audit and report truthfully to regain its legitimacy for being a pure strategy equilibrium solution of the auditor-client incomplete information game. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。