

Animal Ghosts: *L'Animot* and the Crypt of Humanity

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
ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to propose the idea of “animal ghosts,” a collocation Jacques Derrida might have the chance to come up with, by bridging two significant *topoi* in his later philosophy—*l'animot* and spectral haunting—to rethink his critique of human-animal binarism through his view on ghosts and spectrality, and to conceive of a notion of haunting that is less anthropocentric. Beginning with an examination of the potential impropriety of collocating “animal” and “ghosts,” this paper traces Derrida’s review of the philosophical discourses that have together shaped the conceptual division between “the human” and “the animal,” and then, in the course of this tracing, has its attention focused on the chimerical term *animot*. This hybrid coinage problematizes the general concept of “animal” in the singular form by revealing a “crypt” within humanity in which abuse and violence against animals have been buried and foreclosed. Three alloemes—the chimerical, the grotesque, and the cryptic—serve as conceptual knots that associate the many-in-oneness of “the animal,” the etymological root of the grotesque as “of the cave,” and Abraham and Torok’s metapsychology of the crypt and intersubjective phantoms. Finally, following a supplement of selected illustrations of possible animal ghosts in art and literature, the paper concludes with an ethical speculation that, as the experience of haunting precedes manifest apparitions, animals can haunt even without having faces or souls.

KEYWORDS: soul, crypt, hauntology, Jacques Derrida, *l'animot*

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I. Prologue

Do animals have ghosts that haunt? What is it like to be haunted by animal ghosts? Is it an experience similar to or different from facing dead human spirits? If ghosts, connected to death, mourning and “souls”—considered by many thinkers as proper to human beings—likewise belong to an essentially anthropocentric domain, is it even possible to conceive of an animal ghost? Does the idea of animal ghosts anthropomorphize the living beings we call “animals,” as fables and bestiaries often do, or does it allow us to think upon the alterity of the non-human others from a different angle—a particular angle, perhaps, to unlock the encrypted secret about the relation between human beings and non-human animals? Jacques Derrida did not explicitly discuss these questions, although in his later works ghosts and animals came to serve as two of the most significant *topoi*, and although he once elaborated on a certain “spectrality” between the sovereign and the beast haunting—“inhabiting or housing”—each other (*Beast I* 18).¹ And albeit in his final seminar he brought up the well-known notion of human beings and animals being “co-diers” (*commourans*), both exposed in common to unnatural death by accidents, persecution or violence (*Beast II* 262-63), he did not bother to speak of some possible speculation following the death of animals. It is uncertain whether this is because he had little time to do so (after giving the seminar *The Beast and Sovereign II* Derrida faced his own death), or because he had sensed a certain impropriety—or “animal-impropriety” (*animalséance*)—in applying the all-too-human idea of ghost to non-human animals.²

¹ In fact, in the original context Derrida is not addressing the spectrality of the beast or of the sovereign *per se* but, rather, the state of *being spectral* of the beast behind and within the sovereign and that of the sovereign in the beast, refracted particularly in their similarly exceptional positions in relation to the law. This structure of mutual haunting lies at the bottom of Derrida’s critique of the conceptualizations of “the human” and “the animal” as two independent, self-consistent categories, most clearly elaborated in his reading of the ubiquitous animal figures in the rhetorics and allegories upon which human (and humanist or even humanitarian) discourses—especially fables, bestiaries and writings in political philosophy—heavily rely. See *Beast I* 9-18; 20-26; 81-88.

² Derrida fuses the French “*animal*” and “*malséance*” (impropriety) into a coinage “*animalséance*,” which he describes, when bringing up the term in *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, right after his memory of being seen naked by his cat, as doubly improper: both the “impropriety that can come of finding oneself naked, one’s sex exposed, stark naked before a cat that looks at you without moving” and the “impropriety of a certain animal nude before the other animal” (4). Impropriety arises in his shame at being naked before a cat, always naked but unable to be naked—“There is no nudity ‘in

However, refusing to think of ghosts haunting the death of animals because the idea of ghost is *by nature* a humanized and humanizing concept seems to risk repeating the philosophical habit of presupposing that non-human animals have no access to certain features or abilities. This paper follows Derrida's view on the human-animal binarism and traces backwards, from his remarks on animal issues to his earlier thought about ghosts and spectral haunting, in order to see not only how the logic of spectrality remains functioning in his critique and problematization of philosophical discourses on animals, particularly in the term "*animot*"—an "angled word" (*mot anglé*) coined chronologically after the ghost has been on the stage of his *œuvres* for a while³—but also how hauntology

nature" (5). When one thinks of a non-human animal naked there comes *animalséance*, for nudity, as the opposite of clothing, may in a sense be considered as "proper to man" (5). In this light, may we see a similar *animalséance* in the idea of "animal ghosts," since ghosts seem to be mostly apparitions in *human forms* and, further, the very concept of ghost has been cathected with so many human imaginations? For how the scene of *animalséance* sets up the basic tone of *The Animal That Therefore I Am* and even Derrida's whole concern for animals, see Simma 78-79.

One of the reviewers notes insightfully that the term *animalséance* harbors within it a "*séance*"—the typical spiritualist rite or performance to contact the dead—and that Derrida foregrounds this reference by describing the cat's gaze as that "of a seer, a visionary or extra lucid blind one" (*Animal* 4). As an attempt to open oneself to the deceased, the *séance* manifests a set of characteristics that may overturn the familiar structure of a "closed" experience: "spirits ebbing in and out of materiality; strange, half-formed communications from the other side" (Kontou 3). The reviewer thus remarks that the naked Derrida, watched by a cat in *animalséance*, is perhaps haunted by his own animality because he turns at that moment "improperly human." Such impropriety felt by a human being before an animal other—*because* he thinks of himself as a human being—lays the foundation around which almost all issues related to the foreclosure and haunting of animals revolve. Beginning with a reflection upon *animalséance*, the opening scene of *The Animal That Therefore I Am* appears as a *séance* that reaches out, through the gaze of Derrida's cat, to the legion of animal ghosts he addresses without stating explicitly. This paper, following Derrida's *animalséance* and using it as a point of departure, may therefore be viewed as another *séance* that aims to further summon impossible specters and evoke "strange, half-formed communications from the other side"—the precluded "outside" of the human world which has been, paradoxically, encrypted *within* the very concept of "humanity." I thank the reviewer heartily for pointing out this important ghostly dimension of *animalséance*.

³ The phrase "angled word," borrowed from the title of Derrida's foreword to Abraham and Torok's *The Wolf Man's Magic Word: A Cryptonymy* (*Cryptonymie: le verbière de l'Homme aux loups*), plays on a homonymous pun referring to both "angled words" and "English words" (*mots anglais*). Derrida describes the narrative of the Wolf Man and Abraham and Torok's analysis of his cryptic messages as "angled," in the sense that words turn "angular," containing within them distorted and non-linear routes of association, under the influence of a cryptonymic mechanism Abraham terms "*anasémie*." Angled words resist simple interpretations seeking for their traumatic roots through direct retrospection, and thus require an "angled" way of reading, which, instead of moving straightforwardly, may change direction drastically, tracing not only the linkages between words but also those between their synonyms. Abraham and Torok's metapsychology of the "crypt," and their theory of trans-subjective *fantôme* that follows, have much to do with this strategic reorientation. As for the sense of "English

(*hantologie*), as a serious rethinking on debt and alterity, has left the door open to human as well as its non-human others. If Derrida's take on animals have provided fruitful clues for us to spectralize the very idea of "the animal," to question constantly this general sense in singular as a unified, homogenized and self-consistent entity, then during the process the ghost, if not strictly animalized,⁴ may be released from its conceptual bond with the human. "Animal ghosts," the curious combination of two categories habitually taken to be discrete, like the chimerical term *animot*, with its sharp angle, cuts from within language, which plays a significant role in defining humanity, and through this cleft we see the dimension of multiple or even infinite differences between the presupposed "human" and "animal."⁵

On the other hand, even before we try to link up ghosts and animals, the two groups of figures have already had something in common. Both (human) ghosts and animals are commonly seen metaphors used to illustrate *people* in conditions of privation—devoid of rights, speech or dignity. Esther Peeren enumerates what in literary creation or critical discourse may be called "living ghosts"—"undocumented migrants, servants or domestic workers, mediums

words," see Derrida, "*Fors*" xxxiv, xxxvii; Abraham and Torok, *Wolf Man's Magic Word* 16-17; and the translator's note by Barbara Johnson in the English version of "*Fors*."

The idea of "angled word" is important as regards Derrida's views on the human-animal relation because: (1) a word may turn angled when it involves the mechanism of what Abraham and Torok call "preservative repression" (*refoulement conservateur*) and the formation of a crypt (which Lacan sees as the result of misunderstanding his thought on "foreclosure" [*forclusion*], see below); (2) the angled word does not signify an originary trauma, but produces a series of "alloemes" (synonyms grouped together according to their senses and their derivative meanings) revolving around an unutterable scene of loss, and; (3) with its angular edge, the word "cuts" the topography of language into fragmented partitions, frustrating all attempts at one-way comprehension or transparent reading. Through his word play of "*animot*," Derrida seems to be investigating the foreclosing function of the general concept of "the animal" and its relation to human beings or so-called humanity.

⁴ I am here alluding to Marie-Dominique Garnier's inspiring work, in which she incisively teases out how words come to be "animalized" through Derrida's writings—mainly with the resemblances of sounds that contaminate the idioms from within—which include the unusual but conceptually rich expression "*que donc*" in the French title of *The Animal That Therefore I Am* (31), the name of Hegel in *Glas* (35) and even the syllable "*der*" in Derrida's own name (26). To crudely mimic Garnier's extraordinarily critical and creative reading, may we perhaps try to listen to a certain "*faune*" (fauna) in the French *fantôme* (ghost, phantom), and a "goat," or at least part of it—as a part of a goat that makes up the chimera's body—in the English "ghost"?

⁵ As the "primal scene" in which a naked Derrida sees himself seen by "a real cat" (*Animal* 6) marks the beginning of a thinking on animals that is no longer "autobiographical," "self-referential" and always "subjectifying" (Berger and Segarra, "Thoughtprints" 4), the experience of being haunted by the ghosts of dead animals, even if only a speculative vision, may serve as an exemplary phantasm that follows Derrida's "dream of a wholly other notion and use of language" (10)—"phantasm" in the sense that one does not know whether or not it is true or possible but is inevitably affected by its ghostly effects (Derrida, *Beast II* 149).

and missing persons”—because of “their lack of social visibility, unobtrusiveness, enigmatic abilities or uncertain status between life and death”(5), and her *Spectral Metaphor* consists of rich practices of reading these ghost metaphors in the light of Derridean hauntology. And Derrida discusses in detail how discourses based on the notion of “laws” (sovereign laws or moral, “humanitarian” ones) tend to cast their opponents, enemies, exiles and “outlaws” into the category of “beasts” (*bêtes*), and thus produce a strange rhetoric on “inhuman cruelty” or “*bêtise*” that always involves certain bestial figures but is never applied to real animals (*Beast I* 17, 73, 84). On the surface, it seems that ghosts and animals alike mark a certain state of exception, the “being-outside-the-law” in a given system (17), but in truth the two states of exception are not of the same kind. After all, ghosts seem to bear a more intimate relation to human beings—they *used to be* humans—though this extra intimacy inevitably makes them more *unheimlichen*. When it comes to animal ghosts (suppose this is an imaginable idea), in which the two states of exception overlap, the problem grows more complicated. As Peeren argues, despite the general impression of ghost-like figures being passive and dominated, their being-spectral nonetheless marks a special “agency” that allows them to return and haunt the living in the manner of absence-presence: the non-represented manage to make themselves seen and heard (16).⁶ Do animal ghosts possess such haunting agency as well? Are they capable of returning and making themselves visible or audible?

Perhaps the oysters in *Through the Looking-Glass* can lead our way in this question. In an article carefully investigating the ambiguous condition of animals oscillating between the state of “food” and that of “life” in the *Alice* books, Michael Parrish Lee elaborates on how Lewis Carroll’s anthropomorphic imagination presents “a world that is both fully social and thoroughly objectified, where humans, animals and objects trade, share, and

⁶ Another question emerges if we take into account that, in contemporary literary and cultural criticism, ghosts are frequently interpreted as fictional representations of the non-represented or non-(re)presentable in real life, typically groups of people loosely placed under the term “the minor” (once again, a singular form in the general sense), whereas human language actually teems with representations of animals as tropes, metaphors and rhetorical figures. It is easy to see, however, that these are mostly representations *for humans*, and the extent to which they can represent real animals is highly disputable. Derrida comments on this representation of animals in human language through the pun “*pas de loup*,” which can at once be understood as “step of wolf” and as “no wolf, not a single wolf” (*Beast I* 5). People repeatedly speak of animals and compare particular individuals to animals, but at bottom real animals of flesh and blood are absent in their speech.

fight for positions in a network of edible things” (485).⁷ For instance, the feasting scene near the end of *Through the Looking-Glass*, according to Lee, critically brings to light the neglected violence done to animals beneath people’s dining tables, through the voices of animal products (the mutton leg and the suet in the pudding) no longer inactive and silent (493-95): Alice is first forbidden to cut a slice from a mutton leg because “it isn’t etiquette to cut any one you’ve been introduced to” (Carroll 331); later, after cutting a slice from a plum-pudding, she is admonished by the pudding, “I wonder how you’d like it, if I were to cut a slice out of *you*, you creature!” (332). However, even in such a phantasmagorical world where objects turn alive and foods speak up, Lee admits dimly that Carroll’s world of “becoming with” still has its victims, namely the deceived oysters that eaten in the tale “The Walrus and the Carpenter,” told by Tweedledee and Tweedledum (507-09). Unlike the mutton leg and the pudding which are made *sociable* and even capable of reprimanding Alice for her “impertinence” (Carroll 332),⁸ the oysters, though able to speak and plead, behave and react in a generally passive manner and eventually disappear in the process of consumption, as do real oysters that succumb to people’s appetites.

The determining factor seems to lie in the degree of sociability, behavioral agency, and certain access to language or reason (particularly the ability to give an argument, defend one’s rights and resort to manner), and thus whether food and animal products can be treated as communicable interlocutors or simply objects of consumption seems to be determined by the extent to which they act *like humans*. But if fictional creation makes animals speak, reason and reanimate (both the mutton leg and the suet in the pudding are animal products—made from *dead* animals), why are some creatures, such as the oysters presented *almost* as real animals, simply eaten and made to disappear? In Carroll’s world of sociable animals and talking foods, is it possible to conceive of a certain haunting aftermath of the death of animals? Do the oysters just vanish, leaving

⁷ Lee sees in the *Alice* books an outstanding potential for animal ethics embedded in their underlying attempt at “[reconciling] the Victorian destabilization of discrete ‘human’ and ‘animal’ categories facilitated by evolutionary theory with an increasingly commodified culture where everything and everyone seem potentially consumable” (485), and their publication at a time when “animal commodification,” such as the setting up of zoos and the development of the canning industry (495-96), was particularly poignant.

⁸ Notable that when the pudding begins to speak, and earlier when Alice tries to talk to it, the word “Pudding” is even capitalized as if it had a *name*, as is “Mutton” (mutton leg), when being introduced to Alice by the Queen (Carroll 331).

no trace at all, deprived of all possibility of haunting because they are not *human* enough? Since the mutton leg, amputated from the body and cooked, can still be introduced to Alice, and the basically inanimate pudding (made of non-animal ingredients except for the suet) can demand Alice to think empathetically—aren't they, in a sense, already animal ghosts? Humanity seems not to be a necessary condition for spectral haunting. What other dimensions do the silence, passivity and death of the oysters bring, aside from their helpless status as victims?

Beginning with this partial reading of *Through the Looking-Glass* and a barely sensible atmosphere of animal ghosts haunting, this paper will venture to imagine an idea or semi-concept of “animal ghosts” by bridging the notion of *l'animot* and that of spectral haunting in Derrida. The following sections, in three parts, tackle and review the (im)possibility of thinking upon animal ghosts, and how such a collocation (not without conflicts) may offer a different angle to consider animals, their relations to humans, ghosts, and haunting. The first part examines the potential impropriety or even impossibility of collocating “animal” and “ghosts.” As Derrida points out and constantly questions, philosophical discourses have deprived animals of considerable faculties that are arbitrarily considered “proper to man.” It is foreseeable that the power to haunt as ghosts, closely linked to death, mourning, faces and immortal souls, is also regarded as lacking in animals. The impossibility of animal ghosts may be viewed under the same context in which animals are deprived of souls, faces and other attributes human beings have reserved for themselves.

The second part of the paper moves from the “soullessness,” “facelessness,” and “inability to die as such” of animals to the other side of the coin: their non-access to language, in which animals remain silent. They are silent not only in the sense that animal sounds are regarded as mute voices without signification but also in that the general sense of “animal” leaves within human language a gap which signifies either a bunch of human prejudices or a monstrous, chimerical hybridity. By replacing the singular “animal” with his coinage “*animot*,” Derrida reveals not only the evil (*mal*) of this reductive conceptualization and nomenclature but also the cryptic characteristic of the word “animal,” which turns out to be the burial site of innumerable animals as living beings and the secret of what makes humans as such. It is through *l'animot* that this paper attempts to speculate certain “animal ghosts,” with selected *allosemes*—*the chimerical*, *the grotesque* and *the cryptic*—serving as

three conceptual knots that associate the many-in-oneness of the singular concept “the animal,” the etymological root of the grotesque as “of the cave,” and Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s metapsychology of the “crypt.” From this cryptic word “animal,” we then may try to release a legion of ghosts, phantomic and phantasmic: first returning in the confused figure of a chimera (“*animot*”), and then a group of silent others looking at human beings behind the demarcation line between “the human” and “the animal.”

The third part supplements the phantasm of animal ghosts with selected illustrations in art and literature. As previous analysis demonstrates how the idea of “animal” is itself ghostly or at least a problematic abyss that produces haunting specters, the final part moves into the more deliberate use of language and artistic code to see what haunting power *fictional* or *represented* animals may have, and to further question whether ghosts and haunting always presuppose human faculties such as language, faces, and souls. This paper thus attempts to argue that, as literary and artistic creation do not necessarily lose their haunting effects and critical forces because of their being imaginative or artificial, the possibility of animals haunting does not have to be nullified by anthropocentric presuppositions that, besides, are not always rigid and vigorous when it comes to spectral haunting. Animals *can* haunt,⁹ even if the idea of animal ghosts contradicts habitual mindsets and expectations, even if both ghosts and haunting are but phantasms at bottom, and even if there is really no such thing as animal ghost or soul.

II. The Soul and/with the Face

A ghost, in common imagination, refers to the spirit or soul of a person that, though dead, somehow survives his or her own death and strangely stays alive or living-dead. The life of an individual is split up: a part seems confined to flesh and blood, living and dying with the organism, while the other, immortal and separate from the physical body, remains even after the machine

⁹ This “can” will be more properly understood in the sense of the special haunting “agency” noted by Peeren, which, though appearing as a “power,” has its root in radical unpoweredness and passivity.



ceases functioning.¹⁰ Some vital essence dwells in the body as the core of life and, when the organism perishes, it turns into another form of existence, a *survivance* that blurs the line between life and death.¹¹ Given that the typical figure of a ghost preserves almost all the manifest attributes of a living being *except for* physical materiality, this *survivance* of the ghost seems to be, in one way or another, the extension of the immaterial part of that very living life it used to be. The haunting ghost and the immortal soul seem to make a pair: there is something in life more than life which persists even after the biological demise.

Again, in *common sense* (which entails neither justness nor conviction), people do not usually believe animals to possess immortal souls which will carry on living (in the sense of *survivance*) after they perish biologically, and this makes the first difficulty in linking “animal” and “ghost.” There is, however, a second difficulty, more closely related to philosophical discourses that concern Derrida: the ghost is linked to death (especially murder) and mourning, to which animals are thought to have no access (Derrida, *Animal* 5).¹² If, as Martin Heidegger asserts, animals are not “capable of death as death” (*Poetry* 178), it will be difficult to imagine the persistence of their beings in other forms when they cease living. Furthermore, a brief survey of the development of the idea of soul and its many derivatives in modern philosophy—which well corresponds to Derrida’s review of the philosophical history of humanity and its relation to animals—may demonstrate that as the soul or soul-function has been gradually merged with the idea of a certain human “essence,” the notions that animals have no soul and that animals cannot die (properly) have been entwined together.

¹⁰ See *Beast I* 285 for Derrida’s analysis of the “double body” of the sovereign, with one being “earthly and mortal” and the other being “celestial, sublime, eternal,” which can be transposed and inherited after the monarch dies; and 28 for the analogy he draws between sovereignty and a gigantic “artificial soul,” which, derived from Hobbes’s original words, animates the Leviathan-like state and makes it function through social contracts.

¹¹ Derrida characterizes *survivance* as “a sense of survival that is neither life nor death pure and simple, a sense that is not thinkable on the basis of the opposition between life and death” (*Beast II* 130), an echo of which may be found in his outline of the basic features of ghosts and spectrality (see *Specters* 12).

¹² The problem of death is of special significance. Heidegger’s remark on the particular mortality of *Dasein* in “The Thing”—e.g., that “[human beings] are called mortals because they can die . . . to be capable of death as death. Only man dies. The animal perishes” (*Poetry* 178)—remains one of Derrida’s constant concerns in his discussion upon animal issues.

One of the earliest human constructions denoting the mystery in which the origin of vital forces were inscribed, the soul was first taken as the fundamental cause of life, which also served as, for Xenophanes, the essence of the “psyche” (Cousineau, “Prologue” xix-x). In ancient Egyptian Gnostic mythology, God is said to have created all creatures in the world and to have breathed the force of life into their bodies (Franz 5). Later, as seen in the Bible, the vital breath from God becomes limited to human beings alone (Genesis 2:2-2:7). Since then, in its subsequent journey in the history of philosophy and theology, the concept of soul gradually lost its connection to biological life. Both Plato and Aristotle divided the soul into different parts or functions, and in doing so separated human beings from the other living creatures.¹³ By the end of classical antiquity, Western thought had accomplished a conceptualization of the soul which would not change much in the following eras: the first cause of life, the essence of being, the dwelling place of *logos* and the part that remains immortal despite physical mortality.

Remarkably, philosophers hesitated to admit that animals can have immortal souls as humans do, especially when that immortality was linked to the use of reason or access to *logos*. As Harlan Miller notes, the question of whether animals have immortal souls is not a popular issue in academic discussions even when the attention is focused on animal rights (62). But perhaps that is not so much because the concept of soul involves varied religious doctrines which can hardly reach a consensus, as Miller understands, as because the meaning of the soul has grown intimate to and overlapped with *humanity* when it comes to the question whether humans and animals have the same kind of souls or soul-functions. The break grew ever irreducible when René Descartes reoriented the question of the soul into the more anthropocentric question of the “mind” or “consciousness.”¹⁴ In Cartesian philosophy, the mind

¹³ Plato’s tripartite model of the rational, the spirited and the irrational formally defines the soul as the essence of a living being, among which the rational part (corresponding to *logos*) is given the authority to dominate the other two parts that have more to do with bodily functions, analogous to the sovereign of a state (114-22). Aristotle goes further and formulates a hierarchy of different types of souls: the vegetable soul, the animal soul and the human soul (53-55). The human soul is placed at the highest level because, aside from the function of “growth” shared by all three types of souls and the function of “activity” only shared by animal and human souls, it alone possesses the “intellect” function, that is, reasoning, which is proper to human beings (Aristotle 55).

¹⁴ By casting all corporeal and tangible things under a radical doubt, Descartes appeals to the absolute self-evidence of the mind manifesting itself through the undeniable *cogito* for the essence of humanity in the form of a “thinking thing” (*Meditations* 18-20).

that can be inferred from direct experience and logical thinking takes the place of the traditional soul as the agent of thinking and reasoning, whereas the biological body is represented as an automaton which operates in the manner of “reaction”: in contrast to the (human) mind that can think, reflect and give “responses,” this reactive machine becomes the basis for Descartes’s understanding of animals (*Discourse* 46). After Descartes left the question of vitality of the body to God, the classical idea of the three types or functions of the soul were remodelled into a mind-body dualism,¹⁵ and a rational, reflexive human subjectivity was thus born at the price of turning non-human beings into mindless and soulless machines. It is therefore problematic to defend animals by reason of their possible but unrecognized souls or minds, because the concept of soul has already been inconspicuously shifted to that of humanity via *cogito* and consciousness.

While rationalists elaborated on the thinking function of the soul, which is transformed into the mind, the aspect of immortality, curiously enough, reappeared in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. What he calls the “face” (*visage*) can be regarded as a contemporary version of the immortal soul. It is the face that makes one an “Other” for another person and that urges people to give a response to its call. The commandment “thou shalt not kill,” much emphasized by Levinas, is reread as “I cannot kill [the Other as an interlocutor],” and every murder is by nature a murder of the face (*Totality* 50, 84).¹⁶ Even after a person’s biological life ends, his or her face does not disappear but, transported to the tombstone, becomes a “dead face” (Derrida, *Animal* 112).¹⁷ Although the traditional concept of soul as an immortal substance has now been much questioned, people seem to continue to live, communicate and interact *as if* they have immortal souls. Moreover, it is this “as if” that makes burial and

¹⁵ That being said, the implicitly hierarchical mind-body dualism was far from a sudden invention. In the Platonic model, for instance, reason (the supposedly dominant part of the soul) had already been placed at a higher level than sensation and affection.

¹⁶ One may sense in hauntology a certain influence of Levinas’s ethics of the face of the Other, but it is notable that Derrida seems to have avoided using the term “face” even when speaking of ghosts because of an implied anthropocentrism. Rather, Derrida prefers the “visor” (*visière*), a mask that functions as a face and yet at the same time blocks the face—it is even uncertain whether there is really a face, or many faces, behind the visor. And this undecidability of the face(s), the non-face and the semi-face makes up a significant aspect of the experience of being haunted. See below.

¹⁷ Similar thought can be found in Foucault’s discussion on the social “body” which takes up the form of a tomb after one’s physical death (25); and of course the face is the most representative part of the body.

mourning so important in human culture.¹⁸ However, Levinas does not seem willing to offer this face to a non-human being. Not only does he choose to reply in an agnostic way to the question whether a snake has a face, Levinas also finds it problematic to say that animals “suffer,” for from his point of view it is human beings that know what suffering is and project it upon animals (“Paradox” 171-73).

Behind the denial of animal souls there lies the denial of the death and mourning of animals as soulless machines. Involved here is Heidegger’s famed assertion that an animal does not die but only perishes, ceases to live. Like Descartes, Heidegger notices that it will be rather hard to distinguish humans from animals in terms of vitality or biological life,¹⁹ but he goes further to define a human being as having access to the “as such” of being, and to form a relation to the world “as such” presupposes the ability to appropriate the world as what it is and what it will remain to be even in the absence of oneself—thus a being able to appropriate the world as such must be a being “towards death,” a being of temporal finitude (*Being* 216, 353). From this perspective, though animals live and interact with beings in the environments in which they dwell, they can never know those beings “as such” (211).²⁰ The difference between humans and animals is thus not so much attributive as structural. Animals know neither death nor finitude, and thus it does not make sense to think of ghosts of animals, which do not even die.

¹⁸ In a remark on the contemporary debate over inhumation and cremation (see *Beast II* 163-70), Derrida notes that both advocates of inhumation and those of cremation are in fact similarly captured by a “phantasm” that the dead person may remain in a sense “living” and somehow feel how he or she is treated after death, which seems to follow the same logic under which the soul remains conscious and sensible as the immortal remnant of a dead life (163-64). Derrida also mentions Levinas’s view that, instead of being “annihilated,” the dead person is only someone who “no longer responds and thus no longer wants to say anything to us” (164). Does that mean, conversely, when the dead person has something to say to the living, he or she returns as a ghost, a *revenant*?

¹⁹ Hence in his formulation of *Dasein* Heidegger clearly declares that it is insufficient to define it as a “living” being because “living” is the modality of animal existence (*Being* 224), and neither does he consider the opposition of conscious-unconscious as a proper criterion to distinguish humans and animals (and hence his skeptical attitude towards the typical definition of human being as an *animal rationale*, an “animal” having reason or a rational soul), for consciousness and related concepts referring to cognitive function, such as awareness and reason, denote features that can in some measure or degree be attributed to animals, even if only hypothetically, and thus do not uniquely delimit the human essence.

²⁰ He later elaborates this mode of living in “On the Essence of Truth” as one that can never “let be . . . to let beings be as the beings that they are” (Heidegger, *Pathmarks* 144). And when the being in question concerns world relatedness, animals are claimed by Heidegger to be “poor in world” (*weltarm*), while *Dasein* is “world forming” (*weltbildend*; *Fundamental Concepts* 177).

The same is true of Lacan,²¹ who, as Derrida describes, “[keeps] ‘the animal’ prisoner within the specularity of the imaginary” (*Animal* 128). Lacanian psychoanalysis sees animals as beings of the imaginary or the “specular,” basically insulated from the symbolic which conditions a subject of the signifier.²² For Lacan, a human is a “speaking being” whose existence, unlike animals, is inscribed in language in the form of a “lack” (*Écrits* 682-83). Further, it is *his or her linguistic nature* that allows one to be mourned and memorialized by other people after his or her biological death—this is the Lacanian version of immortal soul, revealed in the difficulty of “symbolic death.” As for animals, they do not have a symbolic life at all, let alone a symbolic death.

As sketched above, the history of the concept of soul seems to be the history of a division gradually carried out and repeatedly inscribed. From the ancient “psyche” or vital “breath” commonly shared by all creatures to the Cartesian *cogito*, the Heideggerian “being as such,” the Lacanian symbolic and the Levinasian “face” reserved for humans alone, it can be seen how the line has been drawn: what Derrida calls the “single and indivisible” line between “the human” and “the animal,” or what Peter Singer calls “speciesism” (*Animal* 31; Weil 3). Such a “great division” not only bars people’s understanding of animals as others, but also delimits their ethical imagination. While they would debate over how to treat the body, the material leftover, of a dead person (inhumation or cremation) and how to carry out the “last will” of the deceased,

²¹ This is not to say that Heidegger and Lacan are saying *the same thing*, and neither will one fail to perceive the fundamental differences between Heideggerian philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis, even though biographical documents and transcripts of Lacan’s seminars show clearly that he was a constant reader of Heidegger. Rather, it may be understood as that, as Derrida puts it, “[f]or Heidegger as for Lacan and so many others, the point at that time was to lay out a new *fundamental* anthropology and to reply *to* and *for* the question ‘What is man?’” (*Beast I* 121). Even in thinkers from radically different stances, the concerns they share and the questions that intrigue them most are nevertheless compatible and even commensurable. The logics according to which they tell human beings apart from animals and define human beings with unique faculties or structural formations that essentially exclude other animals are highly similar, despite the varied contents of their conceptualizations. Derrida is not confusing different thinkers and their thoughts within particular contexts, but drawing our attention to the fact that, given their specific interests and diverse philosophical legacies, the thinkers he considers all seem to believe or agree that a clear-cut division between “the human” and “the animal” can be drawn (even only theoretically) and that it is just and proper to understand “the animal” as an abstract, singular concept in general, as a unified counterpart of the set called “the human.”

²² In his famed article on the mirror stage, Lacan offers a typical example of a being of the imaginary: the gonad of a female pigeon reaches maturity as it sees another pigeon of the same species, “regardless of its sex,” or even its own specular image (*Écrits* 77).

as if the soul still feels and the ghost still watches the living, any corresponding concepts about the “dignity” of animal lives and their treatment during and after death seem to remain unfathomable for many.

III. Silent Voices within Language

The previous section briefly reviews the history of the soul and how the concept has become overlapped with that of humanity, which to an extent renders ghosts and haunting to be regarded as irrelevant to animals. This “history” then turns out to be an *autobiography* of human beings, in which are inscribed a certain “auto-definition,” “auto-apprehension” and “auto-situation” (Derrida, *Animal* 24). As an individual becomes a (human) subject by subjecting to the symbolic logic, as formulated by Lacan, the subject, through its lack, strangely receives a certain mastery (Derrida, *Animal* 137-38)—embodied in what Lacan calls an “I-cracy,” which gives rise to all forms of discursivity, be they historical, philosophical or epistemological (*Seminar XVII* 62-63). May not all “histories,” be it the history of a single concept, the history of certain thinking or the whole history of so-called humanity, be viewed as the effects of this “I-cracy” of human beings in the metaphysical disguise of “the human”? Is it surprising at all that a philosophy on the origin of life, namely the soul, turns out to be a philosophy on a certain uniqueness, if not always a superiority, of the human species?²³

Given the human nature of discursivity, is it possible to establish a non-anthropocentric discourse, or to use concepts based on the human “I-cracy” without adopting the presuppositions behind them? Can human beings, Kari Weil once interrogates (26-27), *within* their own horizon, see or hear animals? Unlike Deleuze and Guattari who search for the possibility of “becoming-animal” or Donna Haraway who sets her scope in the “meeting” and “becoming-with” of different species, Derrida chooses to confront this fundamental limit between humans and animals which he describes as “abyssal”

²³ In his discussion upon the I-function of philosophical discourses, Derrida does not follow Lacan’s terminology of “I-cracy” but borrows from Émile Beveniste the notion of “ipseity” instead. Derived from the Latin *ipse* (“himself”), ipseity is used by Beveniste to refer to the power by which one recognizes and designates oneself reflexively “as *the same, a himself, a oneself*,” namely a self-identical, substantial and autonomous entity, that entails the ability to be the master of oneself. The basis of the sovereign and its linkage with the sense of being human lies in this structure of the *ipse*. See Derrida, *Beast I* 66-68.

(*Animal* 12). Through a careful reading of Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan and Levinas, Derrida points out that, though the division seems to be a differentiation at first glance, it is actually a homogenization: it casts all living creatures that do not meet the expectation of what “the human” is into the opposite pole and places them all under a category named “animal,” ignoring all the differences, varieties and multiplicities between those forms of life (*Animal* 31). Thus a series of philosophico-biological oppositional pairs: the human that can respond/the animal that can only react (Descartes), the human as a speaking being/the animal as a being of the Imaginary (Lacan), and the human that is world-forming/the animal that is “poor in world” (Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts* 177).

Such division, at once discursive and conceptual, may well be taken as a matter of language. Language activates the I-function and the autobiographical human discourse which casts all non-human beings into the indiscriminate family of “the animal” (which may include real animals and *inhuman* human beings). Although this dividing line is not so much given as constructed, its effects throughout the times are irreducible. The histories of all ideas, concepts, “the animal,” “the human,” and many other maxims, the products of signification, multiply and reproduce themselves on the basis of an artificial demarcation. But Derrida does not dream of a universally justifiable ethics that works beyond human beings and animals, as some analytic philosophers such as Paola Cavalieri believe to be possible.²⁴ Instead, he calls our attention to the structure that permits inter-species violence and to violence already done in history, or human history that takes the form of violence done to animals that are defined as silent and have really been silenced (see Derrida, *Animal* 29-31), and this remains his central concern when he rereads philosophers’ discourses on animals.

The fundamental problem, according to Derrida, is not so much whether animals have really no access to what is “proper to man” as “whether what calls itself human has the right rigorously to attribute to man . . . what he refuses the animal, and whether he can ever possess the *pure, rigorous, indivisible* concept,

²⁴ In “The Death of the Animal: A Dialogue on Perfectionism,” Cavalieri expresses through a dialogue between two fictional characters, Alexandra Warnock and Theo Glucksman, the problems animal ethics may face if a perfectionist stance or a radical egalitarian stance is taken, concluding that “human rights theory” will be the most pragmatically workable stance concerning the rights of non-human animals, though it is much based upon the idea of human reason (38-41).

as such, of that attribution” (*Animal* 135).²⁵ The sharp question goes straight to the self-empowerment of human beings through words and concepts. Against such complacency, Derrida introduces into language a “chimerical” word: *animot* (41), a monstrous and grotesque term. An uncanny guest then enters the familiar house of humanity.

The adjective “chimerical” alludes to the imaginative monster *chimera* in Greek mythology, a grotesque hybrid of “the fore part of a lion, the tail of a dragon” and a “third head . . . of a goat” (Apollodorus 151). And, like the chimera, the coinage *animot* is itself a hybrid word, composed of *animal* and *mot* (word), literally meaning “the word ‘animal’” (*du mot* « *animal* »; Derrida, *Animal* 41 [65]).²⁶ But as noted by Simma, the morphology can also be viewed as the displacement of *mal* (evil, pain or wrong) in *animal* by *mot*, and hence the formation of the term appears “a first move away from the evil caused, the hurt and harm inflicted both by philosophical as well as by common sense discourse on the animal to the animal—especially through the abuse implied in the generic singular term: *the animal*” (85). Derrida cannot but see the irreducible evil (*mal*) in the term “the animal” (*l’animal*)—“*Le mal est fait depuis longtemps et pour longtemps*” (That *wrong* was committed long ago and with long-term consequences; *Animal* 32 [54], emphasis added)—and it is an evil of word, the “wrong” committed by human beings who call themselves “human,” as a species alone having access to language, and who place all non-human living beings under the category named by the singular “animal.” Although thinkers conceptualize such a demarcation line quite differently, writes Derrida,

all philosophers have judged that limit to be single and indivisible, considering that on the other side of that limit there is an immense group, a single and fundamentally homogeneous set that one has the right . . . to distinguish and mark as opposite, namely, the set

²⁵ For instance, in his critique of Lacan’s claim that an animal has no access to language and thus can neither “pretend a pretense” nor erase its own traces, Derrida points out that traces can always be erased, but structurally speaking no one can have the *power* to erase a trace or to judge the erasure (*Animal* 128, 136). For details about the notion that human beings can “pretend a pretense” while animals cannot, and his analysis of how the ability of effacing a trace is insufficient to tell humans and animals apart and thus turns out to be a Lacanian doctrine, see *Animal* 135-36. A more elaborate discussion can be found in *Beast I* 124-26.

²⁶ The page number of the French version, whenever offered, is placed in brackets.

of the Animal in general, the Animal spoken of in the general singular. It applies to the whole animal kingdom with the exception of the human. (*Animal* 40-41)

By giving a general singular name to non-human animals, human beings also make themselves non-animal humans, and this serves as the fundamental logic of all philosophical discourses on humanity. The use of this “evil” word as “a word that men have given themselves the right to give” (Derrida, *Animal* 32),²⁷ to name and to imagine other living beings as a “homogeneous set” in binary opposition to “the human” seems to be the condition of any a given notion of humanity. Hence the first, fire-blowing head of Derrida’s chimera: the evil of the singular “animal,” inscribed in the very word. The replacement of *mal* with *mot* designates that this evil has been committed through language and is condensed in one word, “only a word” (41). Derrida finds that the linguistic categorical distinction between “the animal” and “the human” brings forth this animal-evil (*ani-mal*).

The singular article *le* (*l'*) designates the word to be singular, but it reads the same as the plural “animals” (*animaux*):²⁸ many in one, like the body of chimera, the term reminds people of the various and multiple forms of life that are written as simply one word, the “animal” (Derrida, *Animal* 47-48). Again, it is the use of language that allows this substitution. From the “naming” in the Bible to the demarcations made in the philosophical tradition, this “cut,” separating “the human” from “the animal” and flattening all the differences into an “indivisible line” at once, marks another dimension of the affix *mot* (Derrida, *Animal* 48). As for animals of flesh and blood, they become the outcast of the realm of language, turning into something incomprehensible and unknowable. People think they understand animals, their features and their habits, but what

²⁷ This is why Derrida emphasizes that to think of animal “privation” (he more than once expresses his hesitation of using the term) should not be “a matter of ‘giving speech back’ to animals” (*Animal* 48), for such an approach inevitably presupposes or justifies the idea that human beings really have the power to take something from animals or give it back to them, even when they claim to refute the very idea.

²⁸ I use the masculine article because both *animal* and *mot* are masculine, but since *l'animot*, evoking the plural *animaux*, embodies a chimerical many-in-oneness, the article attached to it can well be the feminine *la*. We have good reason to believe that Derrida makes *l'animot* singular partly because of this ambiguity of grammatical genders caused by the elision of vowel.

they actually have is but words, figures, concepts and representations, which have nothing to do with real animals except for the violence done to them.²⁹

Derrida describes *l'animot* as an “apparition of the animal” (*Animal* 43), the unseen double of the concept “animal,” an otherwise silent ghost haunting in the figure of a monstrous hybrid. The silencing of animals in language is two-fold. On the one hand, animals are denied the proper access to language, roaring and squeaking but not giving any utterance. On the other hand, the infinite multiplicity of forms of life other than humans can never be sufficiently represented by the general concept of animal—the word “animal”—and the plurality of animals and the suffering and harms they endure are not to be heard.³⁰ Against the backdrop of this silence, *l'animot* allows certain ghostly voices to be heard: the plurality of animals (*animaux*) that are too heterogeneous to be called by a general name, of wrongs and evil doings (*maux*) imposed upon them, of words (*mots*) produced to justify the unquestioned human-animal division that revolve around a menacing single word, “animal.” With grotesqueness that lies not only in its hybrid state of being a fusion of two words or more (*animal/animaux, mot[s], maux*), but also, and more significantly, in the plurality heard in its singular form, *l'animot* lays bare the fundamental logic of “many-in-one” that structures the formation of the word “animal,” an incessant conflict between rigorous multiplicity and a violent generalization or manmade conversion.³¹

²⁹ Remarkably, the replacement of *mal* with *mot* triggers at the same time two other plural forms: *les maux* (wrongs, harms) and *les mots* (words), which further elaborate the evil of word and concept as regards human discourses on animals. The homophonous chain of *animot-ani(-)maux-animots* draws our attention to “the multiple risks of harm (*maux*) caused by words (*mot(s)*)” (Simm 86). These, however, remain dimensions invisible and unthought of, as long as the dominant signifier “the animal” continues to function in human discourses.

³⁰ Even if one uses the plural form “*animaux*,” one may well be multiplying the abstract singular animal figure and still ignore all the *maux* contained in the word. Moreover, it is uncertain, at bottom, whether one is really pondering the innumerable possibilities of other life forms coming before him or her, or is simply reproducing the linguistic and conceptual formation of the prejudice of a general animal by turning *l'animot* into the no less vague and abstract form, *les animots*.

³¹ In other words, if *l'animot* appears a monstrous hybrid, then so is “the animal” which is far more familiar in human discourses. In his reading of Heidegger, Derrida is critical of his “speaking of the animal in general as though it existed, as though this generality of essence corresponded to some ontological unit,” and warns that this gesture risks producing “a positive knowledge that is poor, primitive, dated, lacunary, which would reduce knowledge concerning some animal, some species, to the knowledge concerning some other, and would authorize itself to say the same thing on the subject of infusoria and mammals, of the bee and the cat, the dog and the chimpanzee, etc. . . . about which it is naively assumed, then, that they all have in common the same relation to the world (they are all

Hence *animot* is not only a chimerical word but also itself a chimera. When Derrida coins this grotesque term *animot*, he is also conjuring the ghostly plurality which lurks beneath the abstract concept “animal” that goes hand-in-hand with an anthropocentric speciesism distinguishing humans apart from the other living beings. For the idea of “humanity” to be enforced, an oversimplified notion of “the animal” has to be formed, regardless of the particularity of each species and even each individual non-human life. With *l'animot* Derrida illustrates how “the animal” is an impossible idea, not only because the word itself is a failed representation (impossible to represent *all* the infinite multiplicities and differences among animals), but also because no single word or concept can adequately denote all the multiplicities and all the differences. The “whole animal kingdom” is not a world formed by human beings (in the manner that Heidegger characterizes “man” as “world-forming”), but a foreign land within their familiar horizon, like an enclave, hard to assimilate. Every time one thinks of “an animal,” the only thing that comes to his or her mind must be a figure as grotesque as that of the chimera—here the term *grotesque* refers not only to the confusing state of the chimera’s body but also to a subversive artistic style that may properly describe Derrida’s epigram, “*Ecce animot*” (look at *l'animot*; here *l'animot*; *Animal* 41). It is also via this chimerical grotesqueness that one may trace from “the animal” to *l'animot*, not only to see, but also to be seen by multiple animal ghosts under the singular name human beings have given—have given themselves the right to give—to non-human creatures.

The word “grotesque” is derived from the Italian *grottesca/grottesco*, literally meaning “of the cave (*grotta*),” which was first used to describe the ornamental frescoes found in the fifteenth century in a newly excavated palace built by Roman Emperor Nero (Kayser 19-20; Harpham 23-25). Roughly speaking, grotesque ornaments usually consist of a combination of multiple elements from different categories, such as dissected animal body parts, plants and geometric patterns, assembled together in an unexpected or illogical

supposedly poor in world)” (*Beast II* 197). If one wishes to represent all these different living beings in one general name, one will have nothing but a chimera, with varied singularities converted into a fictional body through phantasmic liaisons. The animal is as grotesque as *l'animot*, but the latter is ill-disguised. *L'animot* may be regarded as *l'animal* stripped naked. With its similar structure with “the animal” and an one-step distance, an one-syllable differentiation, from it, *l'animot* defamiliarizes the term “animal” as a generic name that has long been imposed uncritically upon what humans see as their non-human others.

fashion to produce fantastic and imaginary figures and forms that are thus described by Vitruvius as “unreasonable” and “monstrous” (Kayser 20). The chimera serves as a typical illustration of a grotesque figure, composed of the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a serpent. Exceeding or violating traditional classification and ordering systems, such mixtures feature categorical mistakes, transgressive potentials, and a tendency towards a “paradigm crisis” (Harpham 12, 17). A grotesque figure does not fit into the familiar taxonomy. Even if each of its components can be recognized, as these components are put together to form *one single body*, the outcome always presents confusion and inner conflicts between heterogeneous parts, rather than congruence and unity.

Of course, Derrida does not use the word “grotesque” explicitly, but in questioning the legitimacy of the general concept of “the animal” and describing the idea as “chimerical” he is certainly designating the inconsistent many-in-oneness of “the animal” as a grotesque hybrid.³² And through his characterization of *l’animot* as a “chimera,” Derrida has also wittingly or unwittingly evoked the critical potential of the grotesque celebrated by many art and literary critics to problematize the overly rigid classifications of species and the simple demarcation drawn between human and non-human beings. As a battlefield where the human drive for conceptual or semantic totalization clashes against the incalculable heterogeneities of other forms of lives, *l’animot* can be one of the figures that best embody this grotesque disturbance. Although human beings seem to have overcome the paradoxical combination of different forms of life by naming the artificial category “the animal” and by all laborious efforts define it vis-à-vis “the human,” *l’animot*, a “monstrous hybrid,” marking

³² The grotesque, however, is more than a categorical mistake or an impossible combination. As Geoffrey Harpham argues, viewed in light of etymology, “grotesque” seems almost like an empty signifier, functioning as “a defense against silence when other words have failed” (3-4). That is to say, when no “satisfactory verbal formulation” (4) is available, a figure or a style can only be forcefully named after its excavation site, namely the cave. It cannot be properly identified according to an existing nominative system, and its meaning is radically uncertain. However, Harpham also notes the possibility of covering up the chaotic state of a grotesque figure by coining a new word for its name and imposing on the figure a certain meaning afterwards—this is the main role played by interpretation, although it does not necessarily clarify the original confusion (13-14). As a forced “name,” the grotesque marks the undecidable pathway from a vacuum of meaning to understanding and interpretation. In a broader context not limited to fine arts, Harpham places the central characteristic of the grotesque in its *liminal* state “between nullity and justice”—the marginal gap before interpretations can be made (3; 14-15). Such a definition echoes that made by Mikhail Bakhtin, who characterizes the grotesque as an unfinished metamorphosis, the transitional state in which a shape is transforming into the other, presented as two bodies fusing into one (24, 43).

the “irreducible living multiplicity of mortals” (Derrida, *Animal* 41), disturbs language from within, exposing how people have long been (mal)treating their animal others, in the gesture of the chimera, grotesque and monstrous.

To further explore its critical potential, aside from its impossible unification and its structure of many-in-one, we have to listen to the undertone, a second voice, in its grotesqueness. The grotesque is etymologically linked to the *cave*, the underground and the subterranean. This second dimension, indeed a more literal one, of the grotesque is of special significance for this paper, for it is the *topos* of the subterranean cave that may inspire us to move from the chimerical grotesqueness of *l'animot* to the idea of animal ghost that Derrida had the chance to bring up and somehow did not do so, via a very particular type of “cave”—namely the “crypt” (*crypte*).

This metapsychological concept brought up by Abraham and Torok refers to a particular formation that stands in the psychological structure as a foreign body and thus cuts it into more than one territory. A crypt is a secretly secluded part *within* the unconscious ego in the form of a “rift,” or another self *within* the self, with the two (or more) selves being unaware of, unconscious to, each other (Abraham and Torok, *Wolf Man's Magic Word* 80-81). Such a particular structure results from the mechanism they call “incorporation” (“Mourning” 135), that is, the internalization of a lost object *and* the loss itself into the depth of the subject's psychological topography.³³ Completely erasing the fact of loss, the subject carries the lost object with it and preserves that object in itself as a foreign psychological topography within its own topography, as if there is another unconscious in the unconscious.

The idea of crypt and its mechanism later give rise to Abraham and Torok's theoretical concept of ghost or phantom (*fantôme*). As the crypt within

³³ Rather than the more familiar mechanism of repression which forms the domain of the unconscious, it is the work of “incorporation” or “preservative repression”—the internalization of an unutterable lost object into the psyche—that gives rise to a crypt (Abraham and Torok, “Mourning” 135). The mechanism of incorporation resembles that of the “split of the ego” in the process of mourning (Freud, “Mourning” 247-48), but usually leads to an almost unending mourning to the extent of melancholy, since the subject, by absorbing the lost object, placing the object in itself, not only eludes the necessity of mourning but also denies the very fact that a loss has taken place. This is not to say that the subject does not *de facto* undergo any trauma, but that, due to shame, unutterable love, secret shared by the subject and the lost object, or other reasons, the subject avoids experiencing its loss as loss—“*Incorporation results from those losses that for some reason cannot be acknowledged as such*” (Abraham and Torok, “Mourning” 130). By devouring the lost object, the subject becomes able to persuade itself that the very object, one's relation to which must not be revealed, is not gone but still staying alive in him or her (130-31).

the psychical structure preserves an object that should have been lost, the subject's speech then becomes incomplete, with a specific word and sometimes its synonyms totally removed and locked up. People who receive the subject's encrypted messages (Abraham and Torok name these "cryptonymies") may not be able to know exactly what it is concealing, but can nonetheless sense, unconsciously, an absent dimension in the subject's words. An intra-subjective *nescience* in the form of a gap or rift within speech is reproduced into many inter-subjective *nesciences* through language. Abraham and Torok call the result for another subject of this rift within speech a ghost: "what haunts us are not the dead, but the gap left within us by the secrets of the others" (Abraham 171).

Abraham and Torok's theory of the crypt and the phantom bears an implicit relation to Derrida's thought about spectral haunting, not only because Abraham was a close friend to Derrida and the latter contributed an elegy-like preface to *The Wolf Man's Magic Word* mourning the death of the former, but also because several crucial components in the two analysts' theory, such as unutterable loss, failed mourning, transgenerational transmission of a secret, debt and inheritance, also play considerable roles in what Derrida calls "hauntology."³⁴ Most remarkable of all, one of the major ways in which Derrida conceptualizes a ghost or a specter is almost directly borrowed from Abraham and Torok's definition of *fantôme* as the effect caused by a certain (unconscious) awareness of a gap in the speech of the other, an unsure perception of the non-present in what is present.³⁵ Just as Derrida calls hauntology the absent voice

³⁴ The relation between Abraham and Torok's metapsychology of the crypt and the phantom and Derrida's ghostly idioms including spectrality and hauntology, and to what extent there can be said to be an "influence" between the two most significant intellectual strands coping with ghosts in contemporary philosophy, have long been questions for debates. While Derrida's personal friendship with Abraham and his familiarity with the two analysts' theoretical concepts (which he demonstrates in "*Fors*") suggest that his interest in ghosts and haunting may have been inspired by their "revolutionary" idea of phantom, Derrida himself seldom—in fact almost never—directly cites Abraham and Torok in his writings about ghosts and spectrality. However, some take this silence as Derrida's allusion to the two analysts' contribution in an "encrypted" manner, deliberately leaving gaps in his works to create haunting effects in his reader. For more discussions concerning the intricate relation between Abraham and Torok and Derrida, see Davis 13-14; Royle 281-83; Dragon 260-63; Blanco and Peeren 7-8; Peeren 197n10; Berthin 4; Castricano 20-21.

³⁵ For example, in *Specters of Marx* Derrida introduces the notion of "hauntology," and considers two major historical gaps and their haunting effects: one being Marx's own attitude toward spirits and ghosts as a gap in his writing, a void many "Marxists" strive to fill up (35-36); the other being the effacement of the Marxist spirit in the post-Cold War capitalist teleology that jubilantly declares

lurking beneath ontology as a haunting undertone, a critique from within the rigid politico-philosophical framework of the hegemony of presence, *l'animot* parasitizes “the animal” in a similarly spectral fashion, releasing ghosts that can move through the walls of a firmly sealed crypt to bring forth all the fear of an uncanny phantasm of the returning dead—all the violence, abuse and maltreatment against animals that are not only repressed but foreclosed, that is, not even understood as violence, abuse and maltreatment at all.³⁶

Before moving to the next section, we may add a few remarks on how the logic of the crypt is at work in *l'animot* and how this chimerical coinage of Derrida may conjure animal ghosts to rise from the crypt of humanity. According to Abraham and Torok, the crypt within the psychical structure is both part of the self and not part of it. It is part of the self because, speaking topographically, objects that are included by the subject are buried within and “stand like tombs in the life of the ego” (Torok 114), and what they call “endocryptic identification” (of the ego with one of the incorporated objects) occurs as a result of the melancholic mergence of the ego and the crypt (Abraham and Torok, “Mourning” 136). But the crypt, at the same time, is not part of the self, because incorporation is an unconscious process and on most occasions the subject knows nothing about the existence of the crypt.³⁷

Marxism “dead” and denies all possible value of its critical power and promise (70-74). Derrida describes ghosts, *revenants* or specters as elements that are absent, yet open to messianic possibility in an unpredictable future; a view that only focuses on the present and linear progression sees no ghosts, but in doing so it also encloses itself within an isolated temporality where neither future nor past but only different modalities of *the present* in present, past, and future tenses are possible (80-81).

³⁶ Critics do describe the human injustice or evil against animals that Derrida tries to reveal as foreclosed in the sense that such violence is not denied or disavowed but rather erased and totally concealed without even having been recognized as violence; see, for example, Simma 79. Notably Derrida also mentions elsewhere the foreclosure of the “a-human” in the form of “divinanimality,” both animal and divinity marking the unsymbolized outside “humanity” (*Beast I* 127). The term “to foreclose” is indeed used in the Lacanian sense, and Lacan himself has also, speaking in perceivable contempt, commented on Abraham and Torok’s notions of encryption and incorporation (and Derrida’s response to their theory through his “absolutely fervent enthusiastic preface”) as a distorted adoption of his “teaching” not in “the right tone” (*Seminar XXIV* 46-47).

³⁷ Further, unlike repression in the general sense that represses the *Vorstellung* of an object, incorporation represses or preserves in the crypt the object, its relation to the subject, the secret memories they share, the unacknowledged loss and hence the mourning act that cannot take place—“[t]he words that cannot be uttered, the scenes that cannot be recalled, the tears that cannot be shed”—which then combine to make a “full-fledge person, complete with its own topography” (Abraham and Torok, “Mourning” 130). In other words, what is encrypted is not simply a representation but a *living* person (though phantasmized), buried alive inside and beside(s) the ego as the other in the self. Beside(s) the ego: in his

Derrida elaborates this curious relation between the self and the crypt with an analogy of the enclave: a special zone within a territory of a state that does not officially belong to it, like a secretly sealed “safe” (*for*) within the *forum* where the exchange of signifiers takes place, “an outcast outside inside the inside” (“*Fors*” xiv).³⁸ Read in this light, Derrida’s approach to the “abyssal limit” (*Animal* 30) between “the human” and “the animal” can thus be understood as one that reveals the insidious dimension under the opposing poles—how, at the birth of the concept “animal,” the unrepresentable animals are “encrypted” into human history and the philosophical tradition. The abstract, general concepts of “the animal” and “the human,” both in singular, along with the line drawn between the two categories—not to isolate them completely but to place one under the domination of the other—are made possible only through a radical amnesia of what human beings and non-human animals *share*: their being living beings bearing the same breath of vitality (*animus*; the “soul”), their common passive ability to suffer and to “find death.”

This secret sharing has been concealed, encrypted, as the soul is divided into pieces and a particular part of them is reserved for human beings alone: the access to language, reason and *logos*, the face, and the ability to “die properly,” to be mourned. Derrida observes that

[t]he discussion is worth undertaking once it is a matter of determining the number, form, sense, or structure, the foliated consistency, of this abyssal limit, these *edges*, this plural and *repeatedly folded frontier*. The discussion becomes interesting once, instead of asking whether or not there is a limit that produces a discontinuity, one attempts to think what limit becomes once it is abyssal, once the frontier no longer forms a single indivisible line but *more than one* internally divided line;

remark upon the enclave, Derrida plays on the French expression “*à part moi*,” which can be understood as “beside me, at my side” or as “apart from me, except for me”—the latter especially demonstrates the paradoxical state of the crypt as a region inside me but not part of me. Johnson’s translation of the phrase as “beside(s) me” cleverly retains the pun. See Derrida, “*Fors*” xiv [13].

³⁸ Given the special structure of the crypt, in which the inside and the outside are entwined, it is improper to strictly separate the “interior” self from the “exterior” one, because for both of the “selves” it is always the other one (if he knows that there is any) that should be “inside” but as strange as what is “outside”—but Derrida points out that, no matter how many times the inside-outside relation is shifted, the “partitions” in the structure remain real and undeniable, though not as a single line that clearly separates the inside and the outside (“*Fors*” xix).


once, as a result, it can no longer be traced, objectified, or counted as single and indivisible. (*Animal* 30-31, emphasis added)

Animals, the *extimate* others of the human as speaking beings, stay outside the symbolic, but are at the same time encrypted in the secret safe of language. Like secret objects cast into the crypt, animals cannot be properly mourned in the way Freud expects a lost object to be mourned; instead, melancholically, they haunt. They haunt especially the word “animal” by the path of *animot* offered by Derrida, for the word, the concept, is almost their tombstone, marking their being violently made silent, passive and even absent in the history which has been monopolised by a species that name themselves “the human.”

Indeed, people frequently talk of animals, using animals as figures in fables and bestiaries, and give themselves the right to classify, to name, to conceptualize different animals or place them under one homologizing abstract idea. However, to what extent can we claim to *know* about animals—real animals, rather than representations and concepts of animals, or animal figures or metaphors in human speech—as the awakened Alice dares to say confidently “it really *was* a kitten, after all” (Carroll 339)? It seems that, the more we talk of animals, the further we are from them, and the less we know of their beings as such, and all that we share with them. As people continue to accept uncritically the human-animal binarism and to see and to think with their prosthetic right that “permits one to accord purely and simply to the human or to the rational animal that which one holds the just plain animal to be deprived of” (Derrida, *Animal* 95), they have already been conjuring a legion of animal ghosts. Although these apparitions are but phantasms, they are the real effects of the crypt within human discourses which entombs all the violence and infinitely multiple and ever self-differentiating animal-human relations that are complicated and yet invisible, or that people refuse to see. Perhaps, as speaking beings, we are not without animal ghosts after all.

IV. Under the Phantasmic Gaze

Following the “law of another generation” raised by Abraham and Torok (Derrida, “*Fors*” xxxi), Derrida, when conjuring up all kinds of ghosts, reveals the phantasmic nature of spectral haunting as an “invention of the living”



(Abraham 171).³⁹ This is not to say that spectral haunting is a hoax, but that ghosts should be understood as not so much spiritual beings existing and dwelling in a particular domain as man-made fictional figures on the basis of real gaps within language and discourses. Hence, fictional as they are, ghosts can nevertheless produce haunting effects as “metapsychological facts” (Abraham 171). Further, as Derrida makes it clear in *The Beast and the Sovereign II*, the proper modality of spectrality is radical uncertainty, materialized in the experience of “I don’t know” (137). Claiming that specters exist or claiming that they are fictional makes little difference since, according to Derrida, the two assertions alike close up the undecidable question with an assured answer. In contrast, what he intends to explore is the confusing experience one has when feeling as if one is being looked at by something that “engineers a habitation without proper inhabiting” (Derrida, *Specters* 20) and yet not knowing whether there is *really* something looking.⁴⁰ And this is also an ethical stance Derrida’s thinking on ghosts and animals can bring: it is not ghosts that cause haunting, but haunting that creates ghosts. Although we do not know whether animals really have souls or ghosts—we do not even know how much we really know about animals—we feel haunted by them as other living beings, by their suffering, and by their death.

In this final section before the conclusion, we shall look at several fictional ghosts and artificial scenes of haunting. Having Derrida’s fictional chimera as our lead, we move onto some animal ghosts and ghostly animals created or represented in art and literature, to see how these animal figures made of words—*animots*, indeed—carry with them certain obscure and secret dimensions that leave gaps in people’s imagination of humanity and human-animal relations, and what ghosts may rise from these gaps to look at us, in

³⁹ The term “law of another generation” is not seen in Abraham and Torok’s major writings in which they develop their metapsychology of the crypt and transgenerational phantoms. It may be understood as Derrida’s summary of the two analysts’ ghost theory in one phrase: the encrypted secret in the unconscious of the subject will inevitably be transmitted to the others, silently, in the form of a gap, especially when there is a generational difference or an asymmetric power relation between the two subjects that facilitates transference. However, the transmission of ghosts does not necessarily occur between generations, since cases show that it may also take place between friends, siblings and spouses. The point is that what Abraham and Torok believe to be the truth of spectral haunting is in fact the effect of someone’s crypt upon the others, and Derrida adopts their idea in formulating the notion he names “hauntology.”

⁴⁰ I would like to express my gratitude to one of the peer reviewers for reminding me of this particular conceptualization of haunting as “habitation without proper inhabiting”—amongst many others—in Derrida’s writings about ghosts and spectrality.

phantasm, and ask for our responses (and not simply reactions). Having ourselves exposed to the possibility of haunting, even in phantasms or imaginative situations, we come before the gazes and voices of animal ghosts that may be our own inventions or projections, but inventions and projections correlated with the crypt of humanity, the impenetrable abyss of animal-injustices (*ani-maux*).

“No justice,” writes Derrida, “seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some *responsibility*, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism” (*Specters* xviii). It is almost redundant to bring up the relation of human civilization and social development to animal exploitation—as division of labor and exchange of commodity have become the predominant economic mode of human society, the relation between human beings and animals has turned into one that is far more complicated than the primal relation between hunters and preys—and the logic by which people give themselves the right to deny that animals have certain faculties or abilities and to reserve for themselves what they define as “proper to man” has functioned in a totalitarian manner, in which laws that guarantee a certain superiority and “ipseity” of human beings are made by humans and for humans. So far there has not been any totalitarianism that goes further and is more pervasive than the anthropocentric metaphysics which places the human species in a position so superior that it owns the right and power to determine whether the other living beings can suffer or whether their lives are worth living.

On the other hand, however, Derrida does not call for a complete demolition of the existing demarcation and delimitation, for the thought that one *can* abandon the structure is no less dangerous than the idea of giving speech back to animals, since they are both derived from the same mindset that human beings can alone be the agent, that they have always already been given an extra capability of which animals are deprived. As Cary Wolfe notes, Derrida tries in his animal ethics to minimize the effect of the presupposition of certain “capability” and shifts the focus onto the “passivity” of human beings, their “not being able,” which Wolfe understands as “the finitude we experience in our subjection to a radically a-human technicity or mechanicity of language”

(“Humanist and Posthumanist Antispeciesism” 56). It is therefore this sharable and shared finitude that people often forget, the consequences being that people often think of themselves as the masters of “their” language or “their” concepts (56). In this sense, for Derrida and his followers, the ethical moment emerges not when people clothe animals as they clothe themselves, but when people start to think what they may become if the walls which have sealed up the crypt of humanity—language, *logos*, the sovereign power to name and to demarcate, the ipseity of the self-same subject or I-function—are, by whatever chance or in whatever hallucinatory phantasm, disturbed and shaken. Without the protection of speciesism based on the myth of an indivisible division, human beings are confronted with ghosts of animals, face to faces: too many faces. Hence to think of animal ghosts means to think of a special passivity of human beings to be haunted by animals and exposed to the abyssal gaze of animal violence and exploitation and, meanwhile, to think of the curious “agency” of dead animals whose passivity nonetheless opens up a space for ethical engagement.⁴¹

To see what such an ethical phantasm will be like when it is fleshed out with words and literary imagery, we may first look at the 1917 animal ghost story “Inexplicable.” Published in *The Strand Magazine* under the name L. G. Moberly, the piece of writing itself has attracted little critical attention but gained certain fame because Freud alludes to it in “The Uncanny.”⁴² The story tells about how a married couple moving into a newly rented house are haunted by ghostly crocodiles which mysteriously transform from the carved figures on a small table left by the former tenant. It was supposedly composed in the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, during which the crocodile leather industry and commodification was at its peak in Europe and America. Crocodile skin from New Guinea—this very geographical spot is mentioned specifically in the story (Moberly 577)—at that time colonized by France, Germany, and the UK, was considered especially precious due to its rareness

⁴¹ See, in the Prologue, Peeren’s discussion on the ability to haunt as a special agency of a generally passive group or community.

⁴² See Freud, “The ‘Uncanny’” 244-45. In the original context, Freud places his attention on the uncanny effect caused by the story (he mentions neither its title nor its author) with its deliberate combination of realistic report and fictional writing and its invocation of the primitive belief in animism in the description of wood-carved crocodiles turning alive, obviously showing little interest in and concern that the haunting specters in the story are *animal* ghosts. Moreover, in a similar manner of his treatment of E. T. A. Hoffmann’s “The Sandman” in the same article, Freud simplifies the plot and omits considerable details of the original tale, basically rewriting the story into his own version. See Royle 134-38, for an analysis of Freud’s modifications of “Inexplicable.”

and high quality. It is also hinted that a friend of the narrator's husband, Jack Wilding, is a retired worker from the British colony in New Guinea.

Hence the history of animal exploitation, colonial memory and ghost story are intertwined within a piece of narrative, in which animal figures linked to daily objects (leather, table) reanimate as aggressive ghosts, while Wilding's fearful reactions to the reptilian smell and the crocodile bellowing, along with his traumatizing memory of seeing a company devoured by crocodiles, seem to reverse the condition of the dominant colonizers in tropical countries into that of the persecuted and victims. But perhaps the most eye-catching tension in the story comes, as suggested by the title "Inexplicable," from the conflict between the unknown—whence the table came and why it was left, the strange odor, the pattering and the slithering sounds and the sinister stumbling and injuries of the husband and Wilding—and the couple's attempts at making sense of the mysteries by attributing most of the curious events to a cat ("It *was* really a kitten, after all"?), which is not only more familiar, but also a domestic pet they keep.

Thus, beyond the familiarity of human society—particularly a "civilized" one, though the house is located in an "unromantic suburb" (Moberly 573)—there lie obscure, menacing and threatening undercurrents, demonic and insidious, which are step by step concretized into the figures of crocodiles, one of the most aggressive predecessor reptiles with a "sinister, malicious grin" (Moberly 574). The couple's fright culminates as they come face-to-face with one of the reptiles—"a flat head in which two malicious eyes gleamed, whilst a devilish grin exposed two rows of hideous teeth" (Moberly 579)—in which mingled the paradoxical states of crocodiles as man-eating predecessors, victims of the leather industry, haunting ghosts that cause turbulences and harms, and, most markedly, the totally alien strangers in the wild of the tropics, far away from the Westerners' comfortable dwelling space. The demonizing depiction of the ghostly reptiles in the story reflects the logic by which people project all kinds of negative fantasies to wild animals and represent predecessors—especially those that can literally threaten human beings—as evil spirits. When the crocodiles are merely objects of their aesthetic gaze, the couple see their wild power as pleasant exoticness (both the narrator and her husband praise the table as a piece of art); once this securing distance vanishes, however, the reptiles come before them as haunting specters, driving them into

extreme fear of being exposed to the menacing gaze of animals about which they know little.

Moreover, the author's being careless about the name of the reptiles shows symptomatically that, even if the differences between species have been recognized, people nonetheless tend to reduce these multiplicities into simple oppositions of danger/safe, strange/familiar and, indeed, the human/the animal.⁴³ This spectralization of crocodiles into ghostly reptiles (incorrectly referred to as "alligators") may indeed be viewed as a literary amplification of the existing human mindset as regards the relation between humans and animals, but at the same time it also opens up the implicit possibility of thinking both human and non-human beings as similarly threatening and vulnerable: human beings can be overpowering colonizers but also preys to crocodiles, or frightened souls before the grin of the ghostly reptiles, as crocodiles can be powerful predecessors and haunting specters, but also converted into commodified creatures in the human luxury goods market.

This interweaving of the dominance and being dominated of both human beings and animals, the itinerary of commodities and species through colonization and the plot of a ghost story is also to be found in Sheridan Le Fanu's short story "Green Tea." In the form of a series of collected posthumous manuscripts by a "philosophical physician," Dr. Hesselius, the story narrates how a reverend Mr. Jennings, after consuming a great abundance of green tea, is haunted and tormented by a ghostly monkey.⁴⁴ The reverend asks Hesselius for help, who promises to offer support as soon as the monkey reappears. But before he can return to the reverend to prescribe a therapy, the latter can no longer stand the re-emergence of the apparition and calls an end to his suffering by cutting his throat with a razor. In the final note he leaves to Hesselius, the reverend writes:

⁴³ The author does not bother to distinguish alligators from crocodiles, using the two terms interchangeably, and the ghostly animals are referred to as "alligators" on most occasions—while in fact they should be crocodiles, since living alligators only dwell in North America and China.

⁴⁴ The narrative divides the reverend's experience of being haunted into three stages. In the first stage, the monkey appears at the side of the reverend looking at him. In the second stage, then, the monkey begins to disturb him when he reads, writes or preaches, swinging around him and jumping onto his book to prevent him from concentrating on his work. Constantly distracted and interrupted, the reverend soon becomes unable to retain his job. However, the ordeal is yet further exacerbated, culminating in the third stage, in which the ghostly monkey beings to speak and talk to the reverend in blasphemies or demand him to commit crimes.

It is here. You had not been an hour gone when it returned. It is speaking. It knows all that has happened. It knows everything—it knows you, and is frantic and atrocious. It reviles. I send you this. It knows every word I have written—I write. This I promised, and I therefore write, but I fear very confused, very incoherently. I am so interrupted, disturbed. (Le Fanu 46)

Through these words the ghostly monkey is presented as if an alter-ego of the reverend, watching and observing him like a foreign body within him. Although with the last manuscript Hesselius confidently attempts a diagnosis, it remains unanswered whether this interpretation can really explain away the reverend's suffering as a psychosomatic disorder that causes spectral illusions since the patient has already died. Further, before he can recollect the details of the case and give a final judgement, Hesselius seems to be as bewildered by the inexplicable mysteries as the reverend himself and, indeed, the reader. Even when he has not learnt about the reverend's situation, Hesselius can already sense something disturbingly unusual in the man's words and behaviors, commenting that "[o]ne look of Mr. Jennings haunted me" (Le Fanu 21). Hesselius's experience may in a way illustrate Abraham and Torok's theory about how a haunting is transmitted from one person to another. As one is haunted by an encrypted secret within himself or herself, even if one does not know it, his or her narrative from which a piece is missing turns into a source of haunting phantoms in the others around him or her.

What, then, may be the encrypted secret of the reverend which does not belong to his psychic topography and which nevertheless returns to him incessantly in the form of a ghostly monkey? As regards the haunting effect of "Green Tea" as a "ghost story," Simon Hay's insightful reading may provide some clues. While early critics tend to focus on the private and undecidable nature of the reverend's "hallucination" or the engagement of the story with mesmeric theory and spiritualism (particularly in the works by Swedenborg mentioned more than once in the story, and Hesselius's knowledge of "metaphysical medicine") that provides the mysteries with a pseudo-scientific



but barely rational explanation,⁴⁵ Hay insists upon the rich haunting complexity of the two central tropes and their inner connection to the British colonial history:

Tea, an iconically “English” commodity that is a product of imperial trade, is what causes the veil to be torn between the visible world and the invisible world whose structure underlies the visible. The ghost takes the form of a *monkey*, an animal European sailors often brought back from Asia, Africa, or the Americas because it has no natural home in Europe. . . . The story’s horror is not the lack of a discernible causality, but rather the existence of empire as the structure underlying the availability of green tea to English ministers. (10-11)

The appearance of the monkey—real monkeys—in Europe was a direct result of imperial activities, and hence it serves as a straight example of how human movements intervene in animal inhabitations. Totally different from the situation in ancient times, when our ancestors had to choose wisely where to inhabit in order to avoid the threat of aggressive beasts, people in modern times have become used to transporting animals from their natural dwelling places to wherever they like or wherever there are commercial demands. But the monkey, this delirious trace of tropical colonization, also demonstrates its extraordinary power to bully a distanced member of the British Empire like a “tyrant” (Le Fanu 42), turning the reverend into a mentally worn-out victim, “so abject a slave of Satan” (43), through its spectral “persecution” (38). As he enjoys the benefits of imperial activities (the planting, trading and consumption of tea) as a member of the empire, the reverend is also seriously tormented by the side-effect of territorial expansion and global trade (sailors bringing exotic animals

⁴⁵ For instance, see Birkhead 190; Briggs 45, 51. Besides, at the end of the story, through Hesselius’s viewpoint, partly medical and partly spiritualist, the human discourse seems to regain its control over the animal haunting and dissipate the turbulence as sheer hallucination. However, the revealed mechanism and often-neglected history behind tea as a common daily good and the monkey as an animal no longer strange to the Europeans these days, and the temporary nightmarish reversal of human beings as dominating agents and animals as passive objects to be transported or displaced according to the will of the former, stand as haunting aftermaths that persist beyond the assertive conclusion drawn by the philosophical physician.

back to their countries out of curiosity or economic purposes, caricatured imaginatively as a ghostly monkey in the story).

The reverend is therefore not simply haunted by a ghostly monkey, but rather, at the deeper level, by the unending human desires to expand their dominance not only over human beings but also over other creatures and to fulfil their curiosity for the exotic by transporting animals to regions not their natural homes, which intersect and take the shape of the empire that functions as a magnifier of these desires. This story about a ghostly monkey haunting a British reverend who drinks too much tea thus brings forth, in a fashion of phantasm, what has been left unknown, forgotten, repressed or simply ignored behind a species that seems most ordinary and familiar nowadays. The spectral figure in "Green Tea" appears disturbingly uncanny not only because of its gaze shining in the dark like "two dull lamps" of "reddish light" (Le Fanu 28),⁴⁶ its demonic grin or its malicious deeds, but also because these come from an animal figure, particularly a monkey.

Both Moberly's crocodiles and Le Fanu's monkey are depicted as capable of manifesting certain expressions, especially in their eyes and grins. Presented to the protagonists as figures with faces, these fictional ghostly animals seem to put on literary personas which mediate between the abyssal *nescience* about animals in relation to human beings and the much more familiar animal representations in language and thought. These ghostly figures show recognizable traits that can almost activate what Levinas calls the demand of the Other, but, on the other hand, they are more impenetrable than human Others, to whom we know more straightforwardly the commandment "thou shalt not kill" is meant to be applied. One may not fail to perceive, however, in the first-person narratives of the experience of being confronted with animal ghosts in "Inexplicable" and "Green Tea," how closely the haunting experience is related to the "eyes" and "grins" of those animal ghosts. And unto the facial expressions of the animal ghosts the haunted humans often project their fear and anxiety, as if it were human specters that they encounter. But does it mean that a "face" is a necessary condition for the ethical confrontation of human

⁴⁶ The story gives a vivid description of how the reverend grows desperate under the permanent gaze of the monkey, and that occurs mainly at the "first stage" of haunting when the animal specter has not yet performed more aggressive malice than looking at him steadily: "Its eyes were half closed, but I could see them glow. It was looking steadily at me. In all situations, at all hours, it is awake and looking at me. That never changes" (33).

beings to animals? This is actually a point at which Derrida diverts with Levinas: are animals and their relation to humans to be thought ethically only when they possess faces and appear before us as the Others?

The scene below, taken from a non-ghost story but no less ghostly, illustrates how haunting can take place even without any figure of ghost exactly *in presence*. In a frequently cited paragraph in *Disgrace* by J. M. Coetzee, the protagonist David Lurie, a volunteer worker at a local animal shelter who helps euthanize animals, has once been depicted grasped by a strange feeling, an unusual “jittery” feeling that suddenly hits the old man:

One Sunday evening, driving home in Lucy’s kombi, he actually has to stop at the roadside to recover himself. Tears flow down his face that he cannot stop; his hands shake.

He does not understand what is happening to him. Until now he has been more or less indifferent to animals. Although in an abstract way he disapproves of cruelty, he cannot tell whether by nature he is cruel or kind. He is simply nothing. (143)

Wolfe interprets the experience of Lurie as being *haunted* (“Exposures” 3), but, as seen, there is no animal around him at all when he is grasped. The confrontation comes *afterwards*, much deferred, like a trauma. And most important of all, there are no actual objects for Lurie to confront. It is *something*, inexplicable and indescribable, that somehow looks at him and follows him. Being looked at even though there is no one actually watching—that is the subject’s condition of being “under the gaze [*regard*]” characterized by Lacan citing Sartre (*Seminar XI* 84). A gaze does not need a pair of eyes, and a similar notion can also be seen in Derrida: “This spectral *someone other looks at us*, we feel ourselves being looked at by it, outside of any synchrony, even before and beyond any look on our part, according to an absolute anteriority (which may be on the order of generation, of more than one generation) and asymmetry, according to an absolutely unmasterable disproportion” (*Specters* 6-7). Being looked at without looking back. This “spectral someone other” can well be replaced here in our context with “animals,” or the ghosts of animals, folded, inscribed and encrypted in the flat concept of “the animal”—the word animal, *l’animot*. Another example of artistic representations of animal haunting via a

gaze without eyes can be found in *Modern Man Followed by the Ghosts of His Meat*, a painting by Sue Coe. Giovanni Aloï describes the picture:

Walking home after stopping for McDonald's in the middle of the night, a man is surprised by the vision of animal-ghosts following him. The whole image is in black and white, in order to enhance the ghostly atmosphere, but the McDonald's food bag the man clutches in his hands is painted in colour, becoming the chromatic punctum of the work. (136)

Astute and penetrating as his analysis is, however, Aloï does not mention a tiny but crucial detail: the *eyes* of those animals. Be they cows, pigs, or chicken, all the animals' eyes are painted pure white, with no pupils at all, resembling two glowing spots glittering in the night. What Levinas considers the best confrontation with the Other, "not even notice the color of his eyes" (qtd. in Derrida, *Animal* 12), is presented by Coe in a radical way through her animal figures without pupils.

Even more radical and dramatic still, the ghostly animal gaze is presented as more asymmetric in Edgar Allan Poe's short story "The Black Cat," which, having been known as one of the most straightforward literary works about animal violence, contains notoriously vivid and detailed descriptions on how human will and menace can lead to the most hideous cruelty against animals. Like many other Poe stories, "The Black Cat" follows a rather simple plot, but consists of disturbing component actions: the anonymous narrator abuses and kills a black cat named Pluto, originally beloved of him, and later keeps another black cat, whose resemblance with the former cat deeply repulses him. The narrator's obsessive hatred for the cat finally leads to his accidental uxoricide and self-destruction.

From the narrator's first-person confession, we learn that he is once driven by what he calls a "Fiend Intemperance" (Poe 649) to "deliberately cut one of [Pluto's] eyes from the socket" with a pen-knife (649) and eventually kill the cat by hanging it to the limb of a tree. A mysterious fire following the death of Pluto then consumes the house that night, and on the only standing wall amidst the ruins appears the shape of a cat with a rope around its neck—which the narrator perceives as an "apparition" (651).



Later, the narrator finds by accident another black cat that highly resembles the dead Pluto and, probably in the hope of seeking compensation, keeps it, but soon realizes that the act only brings him “disgust and annoyance,” with “a certain sense of shame, and the remembrance of [his] former deed of cruelty” growing gradually in him (Poe 652). The crucial reason for the narrator to find in the new cat an “unutterable loathing” is that “like Pluto, it also had been deprived of one of its eyes” (652). The story has made it clear that this black cat is *not* Pluto, for, despite the physical similarity they share, the former has “a large, although indefinite splotch of white, covering nearly the whole region of the breast” as the latter does not (652).⁴⁷ However, the even more striking resemblance in *disability*—both cats have lost one of their eyes—nevertheless conjures up the specter of the cat the narrator once tortured and killed in cold blood. What triggers the narrator’s feeling of loathing and guilt comes not from the working eye of the later cat but from the very *absence* of one of its eyes. The missing part on its body turns into a haunting void, an abyss, through which the narrator feels exposed to some ghostly gaze that penetrates through his hideous crimes. The adoption of a new cat that the narrator thinks can substitute for the loss of Pluto turns out only to open up a gap, from which the wrongs and gruesome deeds he wants to bury rise up along with his shameful memories as haunting phantoms.

Being looked at by eyes that have no pupils, by no eyes, or to go further, being looked at by no one, a ghostly one and/or many, also means that there is no way of looking back—what Derrida describes as the asymmetric “visor

⁴⁷ This white splotch plays a significant role in the semi-revelation scene of the story. The reader is told later that the splotch is in fact in the shape of a gallows—“mournful and terrible engine of Horror and of Crime . . . of Agony and of Death” (Poe 653)—and the discovery of such an image which links directly to how Pluto was killed drives the narrator into a phantasmic delirium, the ghost now emerging in full figure. This paper will not go further into the narrator’s mental breakdown and his further violence, for the story is taken here as an example of how the ghostly gaze of haunting animals can still function even without the existence of a real pair of eyes, and an unease in him has already taken shape as he finds that the later cat might have experienced suffering similar to Pluto’s. Moreover, as Derrida elaborates in *The Beast and the Sovereign II*, spectral haunting reaches its most powerful effects only when the experience remains uncertain—“I cannot say: ‘I am sure and I know’ that there is some specter there, without saying the contrary and without spiriting the specter away” (137): the narrator knows that the cat is not Pluto, but he cannot escape thoughts of Pluto due to the physical features shared by the two cats. The uncanny play of repetition and haunting is at work, and it is in this sense that we may describe his “disgust and annoyance” as a feeling of being haunted by Pluto’s ghost. Whereas the disturbing indeterminacy disarms the protagonist with horror and prevents him from hurting the cat, later, because of the gallows-shaped splotch, he sees the cat as a straight threat. At this moment, what comes to his mind is to destroy—in a fashion similar to the key motif in another Poe short story “Morella”—the *second* Pluto, once again.

effect” (*effet de visière*). “[E]ven when it is there . . . without being there,” writes Derrida, “you feel that the specter is looking, although through a helmet; it is watching, observing, staring at the spectators and the blind seers, but you do not see it seeing, it remains invulnerable beneath its visored armor” (*Specters* 124).⁴⁸ Behind this visor, the veil that cuts off all possible knowledge of the others and thus so-called empathy, comes the undecidable gaze—living or nonliving, present or absent, one or many—beneath the visor. Just as the gaze *out of scene* (or from the “other scene,” perhaps) repeatedly calls to prince Hamlet for justice,⁴⁹ it is the gaze from a real, living cat that triggers the thinking of animals in Derrida.


As for the cat in the “primal scene,” Derrida does not even bother to give it a name or identify its sex—what is the *proper* article for *animot*, *le* or *la*?—but admits directly that the gaze from that very cat may open up a crack in his horizon as a human being (*Animal* 6, 9). Through the crack Derrida notices his own nudity that causes shame, but soon after the embarrassment felt, his shame at being naked perhaps causes a greater shame (*Animal* 4). This “being ashamed for being shamed” may serve as the starting point of an ethics that concerns human beings and animals and their relations but no longer limits itself to the simplified opposition between “the human” and “the animal.” In her discussion of a series of photographs taken by Frank Noelker of several abused chimpanzees, *Chimp Portraits 2002-2006*, Kari Weil describes the gazes from those silent primates as “thoughtful, critical, and some might say, *almost human*” (46-47, emphasis added). Indeed, Noelker’s chimpanzees are well symbolized, for each of them is given a name and their stories are “translated” into texts and attached to their photos respectively. This disturbs Weil because in this way what the viewer sees is but representation and translation and the violence done to the chimpanzees and their suffering is covered up, although their gazes—what for Weil are nothing but the viewer’s human gaze sent back—can to an

⁴⁸ It is important to note that, when speaking of the visor effect with an allusion to *Hamlet*, Derrida takes the line describing the ghost’s attire—“Armed . . . from head to foot” (Shakespeare 105)—to emphasize the existence of a full set of armor that includes a visor. However, he seems to deliberately overlook the line which follows immediately, through which Horatio replies to the prince’s enquiry about whether he has seen the king’s face: “Oh yes my lord, he wore his beaver up” (105). Thus the ghost does wear a visor, but one that is lifted up. This is not to deny the value of Derrida’s creative association of the asymmetric structure involved in the gaze to a literary figure, but the detail of a work should not be neglected.

⁴⁹ The ghost’s injunction—“Swear.”—comes from the cave below the performing space, with the character not appearing on stage. See Shakespeare 124-25.

extent “question how well we really know who we are and whether we know what we are capable of” (48-49). Weil’s accurate observation and apt interpretation of the “returned gazes” that expose the fundamental finitude of human beings (as components of a species) well echoes Derrida’s ethics of “being seen seen,” of the reversal of the human’s original privileged position that sees without being seen (*Animal* 13-14), but she perhaps underestimates the *aftermathic* effects of gazes—the chimpanzees’ gazes betray their silence and the hidden violence, impaling human words and language, so that when the human being’s gaze is returned to him or her, it is mixed with certain noises or clutters. To these noises and the clutters that, just as clefts and wounds in language, cannot be codified, one can nevertheless try to make a response, “speak to it” (Shakespeare 89) and even to *remember* it—the last line of the ghost in *Hamlet* in his first entrance: “Adieu, adieu, adieu. Remember me” (Shakespeare 121)—not to forget, not to ignore, and if possible, to imagine, to fantasize being looked at by animals or haunted by their voices.

Now, returning to *Through the Looking-Glass*, can we in one way or another speculate the ghosts of the eaten oysters? The closing scene in which Alice promises to tell the story of the oysters to Dinah the kitten—“you can make believe it’s oysters, dear!” (Carroll 343)—offers a chance for animal ghosts to return. Though represented almost as oysters in reality and devoured, the oysters in *Through the Looking-Glass* have somehow been preserved and interwoven into the narrative of Carroll, their being the “never fully digested remains of fiction and invention” (Lee 509) due to the similarity between their fate and that of *real* oysters serving as a gloomy reminder of the substantial exploitation that is taking place all the time in our daily life. At the level of story the oysters indeed disappear for good, whereas at the level of narrative the fictional oysters, with a speculative connection to real animals, stay within the novel in the form of an absent-present *animot* which, once written, is not simply effaced but leaves a gap that urges the reader to wonder, “So what about the oysters?” And the promise Alice makes to Dinah at the end of the story explicitly conjures up these ghosts, in her joyful tone as ironic as it is shocking, which reminds us that these ghosts of oysters are summoned up to be eaten *once again*—how imaginative and yet how realistic. Through this recall in a twist, literary creations become less distinguishable from the haunting *survival* of real oysters, conceived of phantasmically but ethically as we read this artificial “second death” of the fictional oysters.



V. Epilogue

“The stone is *worldless*; the animal is *poor in world*; man is *world-forming*” (Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts* 177)—what world, then, are human beings forming and heading for? Derrida may have answered: “a world without animals, without any animal worthy of the name and living for something other than to become a means for man: livestock, tool, meat, body, or experimental life form” (*Animal* 102). There will hardly have been human history without the making use of animals, various forms of dominance and exploitation which have been translated, in the name of progressive development of civilization, into symbolic events that serve meanings of the human world, such as sacrifice, totemism, pasturage, analogous anatomy, medical experiment, and genetic industry. As the living beings placed under the general name “the animal” are encoded through human discourse and remembered as calculable values or instrumental significance, the violence and the suffering real animals have endured was forgotten, ignored, taken as not having occurred at all. Animals were not repressed but encrypted, and thus it requires a “third ear” (Abraham and Torok, *Wolf Man’s Magic Word* lxxi), which can listen to the listening of discourses on “the animal,” for human beings to take their first step in *another* relation to animals that may be more or less “ethical.” It is always “the human” that speaks, for “the animal” is silent; but one can always choose to listen to his or her listening to the words and all the gaps and rifts within, so that he or she may hear the silence of those animals buried beneath, secretly but *improperly*, and see their presence in the form of absence.

There is no proper place in the human discourse and history for the hauntological dimension of the relation between human beings and animals, but that dimension has preconditioned all kinds of ontology of “the human” (Derrida, *Specters* 10; *Animal* 31). As for the ethical approach that looks for a set of general standards which may practically and rationally prescribe the behaviors of “the human” as an enclosed entity over “the animal” as another unified set, it appears nothing but another case of amnesia, another attempt of erasing the evils and debts of human beings. Unless the concepts thought to be the most universal and undoubted are first radically challenged and overturned inside out, any human philosophy that dares to speak of animal rights will end




up being another plan to introject and absorb “the animal” into the empire of “the human,” which remains blind and indifferent to real animals.⁵⁰

Haunted, we are not without ghosts of animals. In the dark abyss there seems to be animal ghosts, as if they really existed. But it is as unnecessary as it is impractical to claim over hastily that human beings can assuredly *understand* animals. As Michael Leathy (Diamond 69-70) and Levinas both remark, what if the “suffering” of animals is by nature the empathetic projection of human feeling, since “what is it like to suffer” is a human concept and the sensory experience of suffering is untransmissible? But ethics should not have epistemological or hermeneutic transparency and certainty as its condition. As noted by Derrida, true evil always consists of taking for granted the suffering and death of other living beings and neutralizing the violence and exploitation imposed upon them. “Men would be first and foremost those living creatures who have given themselves the word that enables them to speak of the animal with a single voice and to designate it as the single being that remains without a response, without a word with which to respond” (Derrida, *Animal* 32). The question is thus not whether animals can give a response, or whether animals *really* suffer in the way people understand or can imagine, but whether one dares to face these possibilities if they were, by any chance, actualized. Matthew Calarco, while bringing up what he calls an “agnostic ethics,” elaborates Levinasian ethics into a more general attitude that is no longer limited to human beings or those with human faces, overlapping more with Derrida in terms of a ghostly ethics towards the animal others:

There are no guarantees that we have gotten things right here, or that this particular approach will in fact have the kind of transformative effect we might desire. But such risks are what constitute the act of philosophy. They are fine risks, risks taken in the name of “the Other animal” and without any pretense of fully

⁵⁰ See Wolfe’s criticism against Cavalieri’s philosophy: “It *thinks* it is posthumanist because it seeks to find, via the autonomy and impartiality of ‘reason,’ antispeciesist principles that are taken to *be* posthumanist precisely because only such a procedure, it thinks, can rise above the ethnocentrism and socially and historically bound prejudices that make us treat animals the way we do. But from another point of view . . . that procedure, and that view of what philosophy and ethics are, is a quintessential form of humanism that is, ironically, part of the very problem it wants to think through” (“Humanist and Posthumanist Antispeciesism” 58).



representing or understanding those singular beings we call animals. (84)

Being naked as a human being is being exposed to such risks. Ghosts of animals look at human beings behind the visors people have put on them. It is only when stuck and confused before the undecidable face or non-face, or the faceless face, of “the animal,” which is never simply *one* single, abstract and general animal, that one may, as Derrida being looked at by the real little cat, see his or her being no less “deprived” than animals are thought to be (Derrida, *Animal* 160). The confrontation of human beings’ and animals’ radically passive states of being is what one calls “being haunted.” Real animals can always haunt us even without being real ghosts, let alone having souls in the sense defined and understood by human beings.



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