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題 名 | 代客操作其代理問題之研究=Moral Hazard of Discretion Account |
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作 者 | 林玉美; | 書刊名 | 德明學報 |
卷 期 | 14 1999.03[民88.03] |
頁 次 | 頁13-22 |
分類號 | 563.55 |
關鍵詞 | 全權委託代客操作契約; 道德危險; 代理理論; 投信投顧業者; Discretion account; Moral hazard; Agency theory; Investment company; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文主要在應用代理理論來探討,我國証期會近期所擬開放的新業務,全權委託 代客操作業務。由於投顧投信業者在代客操作時,其投資決策具不可觀察性,也就是會引起 代理理論中的道德危險問題。因此,本文可利用代理理論來探討如何設計最適代客操作的契 約,以降低或消除代客操作的道德危險問題。本文以為,代客操作契約的佣金不得採固定費 率契約,否則會加深道德危險的機會成本。佣金獎懲應以績效衡量為主,且該績效衡量指標 的設計應具備努力水準與報酬相關的關係,如此的最適契約才會產生激勵效果。此外,受委 託的投信投顧業者應定期公告績效與投資策略,以強化投資者的監督功能,如此並可適度地 建立投信投顧業的聲譽機制。 |
英文摘要 | This study aims to apply agency theory for examining a new business of discretion account initiated by the TAIWAN SECURITIES and FUTURES COMMISSION which could be operated by investment company, including mutual fund management company and investment advisory company. Upon agency theory, discretion account would cause moral hazard problem. Thus, we can apply agency theory to solve the related moral hazard problem. The optimal incentive contract derived from agency theory predicts that fixed commission structure would increase the opportunity cost of moral hazard. Therefore, we should develop a variable incentive commission contract on the performance basis such that performance evaluation measure would have strict monotone relationship between effort and outcome. In addition, periodic disclosure of investment performance and strategy would not only help investor assess the capability of investment company but also help establish the reputation mechanism of investment industry. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。