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題 名 | 黑格爾論總念在判斷中的分化=Hegel on Original Division of the Notion in Judgement |
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作 者 | 劉愛民; | 書刊名 | 大漢學報 |
卷 期 | 25 2011.12[民100.12] |
頁 次 | 頁195-220 |
分類號 | 147.51 |
關鍵詞 | 判斷; 總念; 繫詞; 合目的性; 類; Judgement; The notion; Copula; Finality; Genus; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文的目的有二:第一是依據黑格爾的《小邏輯》第160 節到180 節論判斷的章節以及《大邏輯》的第二部「主體邏輯」的第一分「主體性」的第二章「判斷」章作文本詮釋,以證實黑格爾對於康德的判斷表的重建工作是成功的。第二是筆者將從康德《判斷力批判》的合目的性的角度來解釋總念判斷,以澄清部份學者提出的黑格爾將「程態判斷解釋為價值判斷,這個解釋看起來有點奇怪、有點任意」的疑慮,並說明黑格爾以總念判斷取代康德的程態判斷符合於黑格爾邏輯學的基本精神。 |
英文摘要 | The purposes of the present paper are twofold: Firstly, I would like to corroborate, via textual interpretation of both The Encyclopaedia Logic and Science of Logic, that Hegel’s reconstruction of Kant’s table of judgements is justificatory. And secondly, I would like to interpret the Hegelian judgement of the Notion from the perspective of the Kantian concept of finality, with a view to clarifying suspicion spawned by Hegel’s replacement of Kantian modality of judgements by his judgement of the Notion. My conclusion is that the said replacement is adequate and faithful to the spirit of the logical system of Hegel. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。