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題名 | 情緒認知判斷裡的情境性初探=The Situatedness of Evaluative Judgment in the Emotions--An Early Study |
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作者 | 劉希文; Liu, Daniel Hsi-wen; |
期刊 | 歐美研究 |
出版日期 | 20080600 |
卷期 | 38:2 2008.06[民97.06] |
頁次 | 頁243-306 |
分類號 | 171.3 |
語文 | chi |
關鍵詞 | 情緒哲學; 情緒認知論; 評價性判斷; 情境性; 所羅門; Philosophy of emotions; Cognitive theory of emotions; Evaluative judgment; Situatedness; Robert Solomon; |
中文摘要 | 英美情緒哲學裡情緒認知論的一個重要主張者所羅門認為,情緒就是判斷,他所討論的判斷形式不一定是命題,並且讓情緒者與世界嚙合起來,本文基於情緒認知論的立場來探討情緒判斷的情境性。 本文一方面討論所羅門對評價性判斷之特性的看法,另一方面以格理夫與史卡藍提諾 (將出版) 來呈現情緒情境性的內涵,然後論述情緒判斷具有情境性,由此對格理夫與史卡藍提諾 (將出版) 所間接認為情緒認知論所論述的判斷不具情境性,加以反駁;這樣,同時也把情緒哲學的情緒認知論接軌到認知科學與心靈哲學的情緒情境性研究。 |
英文摘要 | Solomon, an important advocate of cognitivism in philosophy of emotions, maintains that emotions are judgments. Emotional judg-ments, according to Solomon, may be non-propositional; such judg-ments are likely to be episodic, procedural or even kinesthetic. Emo-tions, in consideration of their intentionality, may be seen as subjective engagements with the world. Thus, the emotions are put into various forms. This paper investigates those forms in view of their situatedness. This paper discuss Solomon's notion of evaluative judgment, on the one hand, and learn the notion of the situatedness concerning emotions from Griffiths & Scarantino (to appear), on the other. Grif-fiths and Scarantino suppose that the notion of situatedness does not have a position in cognitivism. This paper, however, argues that Grif-fiths & Scarantino's notion of situatedness is posited in Solomon’s no-tion of evaluative judgment. This implies that the notion of situated-ness can be blended into cognitivism. This paper, as a consequence, connects cognitivism in the philosophy of the emotions with situated-ness research in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。