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頁籤選單縮合
題名 | Managerial Liability Coverage, Controlling Shareholders, and Ownership Structure=管理當局責任保險、控制股東和股權結構 |
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作者 | 劉政淮; 紀信義; 翁慈青; Liou, Cheng-hwai; Chi, Hsin-yi; Weng, Tzu-ching; |
期刊 | 管理與系統 |
出版日期 | 20160700 |
卷期 | 23:3 2016.07[民105.07] |
頁次 | 頁397-424 |
分類號 | 553.977 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 控制股東; 管理當局利益掠奪; 管理當局責任保險; Controlling shareholder; Managerial entrenchment; Managerial legal liability coverage; |
中文摘要 | 本研究在探討管理當局利益掠奪 (以控制權和現金流量權來衡量)與董監責任保險約定承保程度之關聯性。實證結果發現當公司控制股東與小股東存在較大代理問題時,則較會購買董監事責任保險。此外,我們進一步發現,若控制股東面臨較大訴訟風險時,將傾向購買相對異常較高額度的董監事責任保險承保額度。本文的結果指出當公司傾向透過購買董監事責任保險,來緩和控制股東與外部股東間代理衝突所引起的訴訟風險。 |
英文摘要 | This study investigates whether controlling shareholders with managerial entrenchment, as measured by greater deviation in cash flow and control rights, are associated with managerial liability coverage. Using a sample of director and officer (D&O) liability insurance data, we find that firms with more serious agency conflicts between controlling and outside shareholders are more likely to purchase D&O liability insurance. We also find that controlling shareholders who face greater litigation risk have an incentive to carry abnormally high D&O liability insurance coverage. Our results indicate that an incentive exists to acquire managerial liability coverage against litigation risks arising from incentive conflicts between controlling and outside shareholders. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。