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題名 | Wage Indexation and Central Bank Signaling Behavior=工資指數與央行的告示行為 |
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作者 | 陳至還; Chen, Chih-huan; |
期刊 | 經濟論文 |
出版日期 | 19991200 |
卷期 | 27:4 1999.12[民88.12] |
頁次 | 頁481-509 |
分類號 | 556.11 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 工資指數; 傳訊賽局; 完全貝氏均衡; 信心結構; Wage indexation; Signaling game; Perfect bayesian equilibrium; Belief system; |
中文摘要 | 本文試圖將工資指數納入央行的決策思維模型之中,文中分析焦點偏重於工資 指數與央行告示行為間的相互依存關係。在本模型中,央行的告示決策主要你取決於工資 指數及公眾對央行決策者的不同言論觀感所形成的信心落差結構。由分析結果顯示祇有兩 種同策略均衡可能發生,其一為無論央行決策者的"類型",均一味的含糊其辭以告示其政 策取向;另一為無論央行決策者的"類型",都極力在告示中標示其強硬的政策作風,這正 可說明各國央行普遍存在的兩種典型的告示文化。此外,分析結果並發現當工資指數提高 時,央行較傾向選擇含糊不清的告示方式。 |
英文摘要 | This paper develops a synthesized macroeconomic model that incorporates the conventional wisdom of wage indexation into the strategic thinking of the monetary policymaking. The focus of the analysis is on the interdependence between wage indexation and the signaling behavior of the monetary authority. This analysis suggests that the signaling choice of a policymaker hinges on the degree of wage indexation and the public's "beliefs" which are contingent on the strength of the observed signal. It is demonstrated that only two kinds of pooling equilibrium are possible in the model. One is that the incumbent policymaker, regardless of his type, seems to be known for his ability to make imprecise announcements; the other, the incumbent policymaker, simply claims 'I am tough" regardless of his type. It is also shown that policymakers are likely to be intentionally ambiguous as the degree of indexation increases. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。